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AMERICA‘S FIRST PATENTS
Michael Risch
Abstract
Courts and commentators vigorously debate early American patent
history because of a spotty documentary record. To fill these gaps,
scholars have examined the adoption of the Intellectual Property Clause
of the Constitution, correspondence, dictionaries, and British and
colonial case law. But there is one largely ignored body of
information—the content of early patents themselves. While many
debate what the founders thought, no one asks what early inventors
thought—and those thoughts are telling. This Article is the first
comprehensive examination of how early inventors and their patents
should inform our current thoughts about the patent system.
To better understand our early patent history, we read every
available patent issued prior to the institution of the ―modern‖
examination system in 1836, totaling nearly 2,500 handwritten patents.
For good measure, we also read the first 1,200 patents issued after 1836,
the last of which issued in the middle of 1839.
Part I discusses how vague and ambiguous patents are relevant to
early judicial discussion of ―principles.‖ In conjunction with misplaced
reliance on English law, the patents suggest a different interpretation of
―principles‖ in these cases. In short, patentable subject matter
jurisprudence developed in a way that was not necessarily intended by
the first Congress.
Part II discusses some noteworthy patents, including asbestos and
lead paint, milk of magnesia, many business methods, and a
programmable loom that predated Babbage‘s Analytical Engine. This
might lead us to reconsider how we view technological change in the
patent system.
Part III presents a surprising rebuttal to those who believe that the
machine-or-transformation test is engrained in American inventive
ethos. This test requires that, to be patentable subject matter, a claimed
process must be performed by a machine or transform matter to a
different state. Though the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit formally introduced this test in 2008, courts and scholars
present it as a ―historical‖ limitation on patentable subject matter.
 Michael Risch, Associate Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. The
author thanks Colleen Chien, Tom Field, Adam Mossoff, Kristen Osenga, David Schwartz, and
various commenters at Groklaw and the Patently-O blogs for their helpful comments and
feedback. Douglas Behrens, Richard Eiszner, Jonathan Lombardo, Cailyn Reilly, and Megan
Wood provided valuable research assistance.
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Examination of the first fifty years of patents shows that forty percent of
patented processes would have failed the machine-or-transformation
test, whether or not the patents were tested by the Patent Office. Many
method patents did not involve a machine and did not transform matter
to a different state or thing.
This Article concludes with some suggestions about how we might
rethink patentable subject matter in light of America‘s first patents.
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INTRODUCTION
Courts and commentators vigorously debate early American patent
history because of a spotty documentary record.1 To fill in these gaps,
scholars have examined the adoption of the Intellectual Property Clause
of the Constitution, correspondence, dictionaries, as well as British and
colonial case law.2 But there is one largely ignored body of
information—the content of early patents themselves.3 While many
debate what the Founders thought, no one asks what early inventors
thought.4 This Article is the first comprehensive examination of how
early inventors and their patents should inform our current thoughts
about the patent system.5
To better understand our early patent history, we6 read every
available patent issued prior to the institution of the ―modern‖
examination system in 1836, totaling nearly 2,500 handwritten patents.

1. See Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents?
Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 977 (2007)
(―One of the pressing problems with assessing the historical record in patent law, especially for
anyone who uses this record today, is the paucity of Founding Era references to the Copyright
and Patent Clause specifically and patent law generally.‖).
2. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, The Mixed Heritage of Federal Intellectual Property Law
and Ramifications for Statutory Interpretation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON
LAW (Shyam Balganesh ed., forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1895784;
EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2002) (exploring the history and the written correspondences behind
the development of U.S. patent law); Robert A. Kreiss, Patent Protection for Computer
Programs and Mathematical Algorithms: The Constitutional Limitations on Patentable Subject
Matter, 29 N.M. L. REV. 31 (1999); Steven Lubar, The Transformation of Antebellum Patent
Law, 32 TECH. & CULTURE 932 (1991); Andrew P. Morriss & Craig Allen Nard, Institutional
Choice & Interest Groups in the Development of American Patent Law: 1790–1865, 19 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 143 (2011) (discussing the doctrinal development of patent law); Mossoff, supra
note 1; Malla Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business Method Patents: Common
Sense, Congressional Consideration, and Constitutional History, 28 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH.
L.J. 61 (2002); Frank D. Prager, The Influence of Mr. Justice Story on American Patent Law, 5
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 254 (1961); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski:
History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53 (2011).
3. Some have looked at summary data for economic analysis, but not the details for legal
analysis. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Inventive Activity in Early Industrial America:
Evidence from Patent Records, 1790–1846, 48 J. ECON. HIST. 813, 813–14 (1988).
4. Edward C. Walterscheid, Patents and the Jeffersonian Mythology, 29 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 269, 313 (1995) (―[Jefferson‘s] standards in this regard were high—perhaps higher than
most Americans of the time thought necessary.‖).
5. To be sure, some early patents (such as the cotton gin) are highlighted in the literature,
but no one has looked at the entire body of patents.
6. Here, ―we‖ refers to the author and his several research assistants. The author
reviewed every coding decision.
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For good measure, we also read the first 1,200 patents issued after 1836,
the last of which issued in the middle of 1839.7
In addition to their historic relevance, early American patents are
helpful because most were filed at a time when virtually every patent
application issued as a patent without any substantive review. That is,
patent applications did not undergo any consideration on the merits like
they do today. Indeed, until 1836, the statute forbade such
consideration;8 if one applied for a patent, one was almost always
granted a patent.9 As a result, these unexamined patents constitute
important and untainted evidence: inventions that Americans thought
were patentable in our early history, without editing by the Patent
Office, courts, or legislatures.
This period of non-examination is also helpful because two periods
of examination are available for comparison. The first was between
April 1790 and February 1793, when the Attorney General (Edmund
Randolph), the Secretary of War (Henry Knox), and the Secretary of
State (Thomas Jefferson) determined whether patents should issue.10
Only fifty-seven patents issued during this time, and only five survive
today.11 The second examination period began in July 1836, when the
patent commissioner and his assistants began examining patents on their
merits. These bookends allow us to consider whether patent filings
during the time when every patent was allowed differed from those that
inventors filed when gatekeepers determined the sufficiency of the
application.
To be sure, many of the patents would be invalid by today‘s
standards (or even by nineteenth-century standards); indeed, poor patent
quality was one of the reasons for the reinstitution of the examination
system in 1836.12 Thus, the primary relevance of these non-examined
patents is not whether they were meritorious, but that they show what
types of inventions inventors thought could or should be patentable.
7. Filing dates are not recorded on these early patents, but we are confident that we
captured most, if not all, patents filed prior to the institution of the modern examination system.
8. See Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 241 (1832) (holding that the Secretary of State
must grant all applications if ministerial requirements were met).
9. EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN
PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1798–1836, at 259–64 (1998) (discussing early refusals to
patent and warnings to patentees that their invention may not be new, despite registration
requirement).
10. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109–112 (repealed 1793) [hereinafter 1790
Patent Act].
11. Walterscheid, supra note 4, at 288. Perhaps it is not a surprise that Thomas Jefferson
suggested that examinations be abandoned, much to his later regret. See id. at 312.
12. JOHN RUGGLES, SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE
PATENT OFFICE, S. DOC. NO. 24-338, at 4 (1836).
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This study yields qualitative and quantitative insights into three
primary areas relating to patentable subject matter. These insights are
missing from prior historical analysis,13 and each Part of this Article
discusses one.
Part I describes the patents we reviewed and our methodology for
reviewing them. Even if the patents were printed rather than
handwritten, they were difficult to read because inventors were simply
unclear about what they invented. Even after the Patent Act of 1836
required that patents include ―claims‖ to the invention,14 patent
applicants continued to describe their inventions in ways that made it
very difficult to determine exactly what they had invented.
Meanwhile, early nineteenth-century cases often discussed the
unpatentability of ―principles.‖ Modern interpretations view these as
important cases defining what types of inventions can be patented.15
Part I discusses how vague and ambiguous patents are relevant to early
judicial discussion of principles. In conjunction with misplaced reliance
on English law, the patents suggest a different interpretation of
―principles‖ in these cases. In other words, patentable subject matter
jurisprudence developed in a way that was not necessarily intended by
the First Congress.
Early judicial decisions relied heavily on English law to interpret
U.S. law, but the English patent statute differed from the U.S. patent
statute in important ways. As a result, there was a disconnect between
how patentees described their inventions and how some judges (and one
important judge)16 viewed patents. Additionally, judicial discussion of
principles almost never related to attempts to patent natural phenomena,
but instead related to patent construction—determining what the
inventor wanted to exclude others from doing. By assuming that the
patent was not for an abstract or natural principle, courts could better

13. Future work might examine families of patents for novelty and obviousness issues,
though such issues are more difficult given the lack of patent examination or prior art searching.
See Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
179, 200 (2007) (―Moreover, because the applicant is not required to search for prior art, the
initial claims represent what the patentee thinks might be novel and nonobvious.‖); see also
Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Human Rights in the Nonmultilateral Era, 64 FLA. L.
REV. 1045 (2012) (discussing different approaches to determining whether certain subject matter
are patentable).
14. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 5, 5 Stat. 117 (amended 1870, repealed 1952)
[hereinafter 1836 Patent Act] (―[S]pecifying what the patentee claims as his invention or
discovery‖).
15. See, e.g., Sarnoff, supra note 2.
16. Justice Joseph Story had an outsize influence on patent law. See infra notes 126–27,
130–31, 146–47 and accompanying text.
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determine what the patent did cover. As a result, we should reconsider
how we understand early subject matter discussion.
Part II summarizes the types of inventions early patentees sought to
patent, and also includes the modern United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) technology classifications. This Part
discusses several exemplary patents in detail to illustrate on what
inventors were working during the first fifty years of the patent system.
Lead paint and asbestos abounded, but there were also many important
inventions. As might be expected, early patents covered technology
very differently from today‘s patents. However, several patents
described business methods, and one even covered rudimentary
―software.‖17
This leads to the second insight: We should reconsider how we view
technological change in the patent system. For example, assuming that
new types of technology should be suspect until Congress acts would be
far too limiting. Congress could not have foreseen the patents that
inventors sought a few years after our nation‘s founding, let alone
during the last one hundred years. Further, interpreting patent laws to
cover only ―technology‖ would outlaw many patents—and not just
business methods—that our first inventors thought were proper
patentable subject matter.
Part III presents a surprising rebuttal to those who believe that the
―machine-or-transformation test‖ is engrained in the American
inventive ethos. This test requires that, to be patentable subject matter, a
claimed process must either be performed by a machine or transform
matter into a different state. Though the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit formally introduced this test in 2008,18 courts
and scholars present it as a ―historical‖ limitation on patentable subject
matter.19
Examination of the first fifty years of patents shows that about forty
percent of patented processes would have failed the machine-ortransformation test, whether or not the patents were tested by the Patent
Office. In other words, many methods patents did not involve a machine
and did not transform matter into a different state or thing. Neither
inventors nor gatekeepers objected to patents that would fail today‘s
test.
17. See infra Section II.F.
18. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff‟d but criticized sub nom. Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
19. Id.; see also Peter. S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No
Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski‟s Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity to
Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1295 (2011); Sarnoff,
supra note 2.
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This leads to the third insight: the machine-or-transformation test,
which is currently a rule of thumb to determine whether methods may
be patented, should be reconsidered. At the very least, it should not be
touted as a historically applicable test.
This Article concludes with some thoughts about how America‘s
first patents should refocus the debate toward solving modern problems
with modern considerations rather than relying on a false sense of
history.
I. INTERPRETING AMERICA‘S FIRST PATENTS
This Part discusses how we identified and went about understanding
early patents. Interpreting patents, it turns out, was no small feat due to
the peculiar way in which inventors wrote patents at the time. Patents
today, many of which people claim are too vague, have nothing on our
first patents.20 Indeed, much of the subject matter jurisprudence of the
time was an attempt to determine what the patentee was actually
attempting to protect with the patent.
As one might expect, reliance on history decreases as time
increases. A brief treatise-citation study by the author illustrates
scholarly emphasis on modern patent treatises. The most cited treatise,
Chisum on Patents,21 first appeared in 1983 and has garnered 1,281
citations in Westlaw‘s JLR database.22 Next is Walker on Patents23
(1883present), with 425 citations. Following are Robinson on
Patents24 (1890), with 264 citations; Curtis on Patents25 (1849–1873),
with 76; Phillips on Patents26 (1837), with 30; and Fessenden on
Patents27 (1810 and 1822), with 18.
20. William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 MICH.
L. REV. 755, 757–58 (1948); see also Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents, 20
J. PAT. OFF. SOC‘Y 134, 139–41 (1938). But see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or
Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1746–47 (2009)
(arguing that current claiming methodology leaves patent scope uncertain, and that a return to
―central‖ claiming might improve patent clarity).
21. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS (Matthew Bender ed., 2011).
22. Citations counted on January 3, 2012. Results in HeinOnline were similar.
23. R. CARL MOY, MOY‘S WALKER ON PATENTS (4th ed. 2011).
24. WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS (1890).
25. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL
INVENTIONS, AS ENACTED AND ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (4th ed.
Lawbook Exch. 1873).
26. WILLARD PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS; INCLUDING THE REMEDIES
AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN RELATION TO PATENT RIGHTS (American Stationers‘ Co. 1837).
27. THOMAS G. FESSENDEN, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR NEW INVENTIONS (D.
Mallory & Co. 1810) [hereinafter FESSENDEN (1810)]; THOMAS GREEN FESSENDEN, AN ESSAY
ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR NEW INVENTIONS (Charles Ewer ed., 2d ed. 1822) [hereinafter
FESSENDEN (1822)].
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Declining reliance on history is detrimental when considering
patentable subject matter, a topic where so many use history to support
their position. For example, case law barely considers the history of the
types of inventions patented at our nation‘s founding, yet routinely
pronounces rules based on historic requirements.28 Apparently, until
twenty-five years ago, most people did not even know patent data were
available for the period before 1836.29
The primary early references on which modern observers rely are
Jefferson‘s views of patents from the early 1800s. However, his
thoughts may not be an accurate reflection of historical views about
patents, and his contemporary influence is largely overstated.30 Thus,
examining early mainstream patent activity may supplement current
views of history, especially in the area of patentable subject matter.
A. Locating the Patents
We began with an index of all historical patents, which is provided
in a publicly available spreadsheet.31 All of the patents that issued from
1790–1836 are known as ―X‖ patents because they were not numbered;
the USPTO retroactively renumbered them starting with X1.32 The first
patent to issue under the examination system in 1836 restarted at Patent
No. 1.

28. For example, the earliest case cited by Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), to
define ―transformation‖ was issued in 1853, as discussed infra at note 87. See Bilski v. Kappos,
130 S. Ct. 3218, 3246 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing cases outlawing business method
patents beginning in 1893).
29. See Robert R. MacMurray, Technological Change in a Society in Transition: Work in
Progress on a Unified Reference Work in Early American Patent History, 45 J. ECON. HIST. 299,
299 (1985).
30. Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Revising the “Original” Patent Clause: Pseudohistory in
Constitutional Construction, 2 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 155, 166 (1989) (―Jefferson‘s unheeded
proposals for restriction, if not elimination, of the intellectual property power indicate that his
opinions were shared neither by the framers of the Constitution nor by the Congress that drafted
the Bill of Rights.‖); Mossoff, supra note 1, at 959 (―[T]he Jeffersonian story of patent law is at
best a half-truth—at worst, it is an outright myth.‖); Walterscheid, supra note 4, at 311
(remarking that ―only in the twentieth century has the Supreme Court seen fit to consider
Jefferson as an oracle regarding the early interpretation of the patent law.‖).
31. See Jim Shaw, Historical Patent and Trademark Databases, PATENT AND TRADEMARK
DEPOSITORY LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, http://www.pdtla.org/history (last visited Mar. 23, 2012);
see also HENRY L. ELLSWORTH, A DIGEST OF PATENTS, ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES, FROM
1790 TO JANUARY 1, 1839 (1840).
32. See Teresa Riordan, Lawyers Unearth Early Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/09/technology/09patent.html; http://www.archives.gov/resea
rch/guide-fed-records/groups/241.html (last visited, Jan. 5, 2012).
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The index we used listed 9,986 X patents, because several patents
were assigned duplicate numbers.33 A fire at the Patent Office in 1836
destroyed many of these patents. Many others were missing from
available databases even though they were listed as not having been
destroyed.34 Still others were simply illegible.35 In the end, we coded
summary data (such as date and technology class) for about 2,525 of the
X patents, and coded patent content for 2,480 of them.35
Additionally, we read the first 1,200 patents issued beginning in
mid-1836 (fifteen of which were not found in the USPTO database).
The last of these patents issued in mid-1839, providing three years of
experience under the new examination system, and allowing for
issuance of virtually all patents for which applications were made prior
to the move to an examination system.
To read and code the patents, we first located images of the patents
using two sources—either the USPTO website36 or the Google patents
database.37 Both sources largely overlapped, but there were a few
instances where one database included a patent unavailable in the other.
For some patents beginning in the late 1820s, we also consulted the
Journal of the Franklin Institute,38 which often had summaries of issued
patents or even printed versions of specifications that were only
handwritten in Patent Office records. We also found additional patent
specifications in online archives, in court opinions and records, and in
secondary sources. We recorded the current U.S. patent classification
for each patent, which was available on the USPTO website.
B. Central Claiming and Ambiguous Patents
To test the history of methods patenting, we attempted to determine
whether each patent claimed a method as opposed to a thing. This was
not always easy for two reasons. First, some patents were barely legible,
and some included drawings that seemed to contradict their descriptions
in the index. We labored to determine whether a method was being
claimed, but erred against finding a method if we could not tell.

33. The last X patent is X9903.
34. MacMurray, supra note 29, at 300 (noting that National Archive index is inaccurate).
35. See id.
35. We also noted several patents that are inaccurately recorded on available lists.
36. Search for Patents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/patents
/process/search/ (last visited July 3, 2012).
37. GOOGLE PATENTS, www.google.com/patents/ (last visited July 3, 2012).
38. The Franklin Institute was founded in 1824 to advance the ―mechanic arts,‖ and its
journal was first published in 1826. http://www2.fi.edu/shared/history.php (last visited July 5,
2012). The journal continues today as a peer-reviewed academic journal.
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Second, many patents did not contain any ―claims‖ as we know
them now because claims were not required prior to 1836.39 Indeed,
some of the earliest patents did not even contain full specifications, but
instead only set forth condensed ―schedules‖ that described the
inventions.40
As time went on, though, many patents included both specifications
and claims. Contrary to conventional wisdom that patentees did not
include claims in their patents before 1836, specific claim language
such as ―I claim‖ and ―I do not claim‖ appeared in patents much
earlier.41 Such language predated the statutory requirement42 in large
part due to early cases that required patentees to identify the parts of
their machines that made them distinct from prior art.43 Even so, many
did not include such helpful language.
Further, even when claims were included, early patents used what is
now called ―central claiming.‖ Unlike peripheral claims of today,44
which attempt to define the exact boundaries of a patentee‘s claim in a
patent, central claims described the general nature of the invention and
left it to readers (and the courts) to determine the exact boundaries the
patent protected.45
The Journal of the Franklin Institute describes one such patent,
Patent No. X9,472, to Nathan Lockling on March 4, 1836. It notes,
―This improvement is, to us, truly transcendental; or, in other words, we
39. See Joseph S. Cianfrani, An Economic Analysis of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 1 VA.
J.L. & TECH. 1, ¶¶ 5–8 (1997) (discussing history of claims requirement).
40. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 9, at 297.
41. See Cianfrani, supra note 39, at ¶ 7 n.14 (citing pre-1836 patent which included
claims); see also Lutz, supra note 20, at 138–40 (discussing history of claiming from 1790
through 1938); Woodward, supra note 20, at 758–60 (attributing ―I claim‖ to Robert Fulton in
1811, and arguing that claims were routinely used before 1836).
42. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 9, at 258 (discussing 1828 Patent Office rules
recommending use of ―I claim‖ at end of specification).
43. See, e.g., Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 435 (1822) (holding that inventor ―ought to
describe what his own improvement is, and to limit his patent to such improvement‖); Wyeth v.
Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723, 727 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) (No. 18,107); Woodcock v. Parker, 30 F. Cas.
491, 492 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,971) (explaining that patent for whole machine will only
issue if machine is new; otherwise the patent must be confined to improvement); Whittemore v.
Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600). Even when patentees included
claims, they were still subject to invalidation for failure to identify the improvement. Evans, 20
U.S. at 435.
44. The Patent Act of 1870 was the first to require specific identification of claim
boundaries. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198–217 (requiring inventor to
―particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which he
claims as his invention or discovery‖). Like claiming generally, peripheral claiming predated the
statute. See Lutz, supra note 20.
45. Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1746 (describing central claiming approach to
patents).
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are unable to follow out the intention of the inventor, even with the aid
of a well executed drawing . . . ‗We give it up.‘‖46 Justice Bushrod
Washington, sitting as a circuit justice, described another: ―How then
can any human being, however skilful in the art, find out, with certainty,
or even conjecture, in what the improvement consists, from the patent
itself, or from the records in the patent office? . . . As the matter stands,
the nature of the improvement is altogether unintelligible.‖47
Central claiming yields some interesting patent language that looks
foreign to modern readers. Today, one claims the specific elements of a
machine or steps in a process, such as, ―I claim a pencil, comprising a
graphite writing component embedded in wood.‖ Central claiming,
instead, often listed the things that the patentee wished to exclude others
from doing. Thus, the pencil claim might read, ―I claim the right to
exclude others from making pencils by embedding graphite writing
components into wood.‖ As a practical matter, both patents exclude the
same thing—anyone making a pencil with graphite embedded in wood
infringes. However, the central claim looks a lot like a method patent of
today, appearing to claim the method of making a pencil, rather than the
pencil itself.48 This leads to ambiguity about how to treat downstream
sellers and users of the pencil because they did not actually practice the
method, nor did the patentee seek to exclude them.
A good example is illustrated in Patent No. X3,130, to Jethro Wood
on September 1, 1819: ―In the first place, the said Jethro Wood claims
an exclusive privilege for constructing the part of the Plough . . . called
the mould-board, in the manner hereinafter mentioned.‖49 This patent
could be for the mouldboard with the described configuration, or for the
process of manufacturing a mouldboard in a particular manner.50
To complicate matters, both the 1793 and the 1836 Patent Acts
required inventors of machines to specifically identify the principles
that made their machines novel.51 Prior English cases held that
46. List of American Patents Which Issued in March, 1836, with Remarks and
Exemplifications by the Editor, 18 J. FRANKLIN INST. 312, 320–21 (1836), available at http://boo
ks.google.com/books?id=IulIAAAAMAAJ&pg=RA1-PA320.
47. Isaacs v. Cooper, 13 F. Cas. 153, 154 (C.C.D. Pa. 1821) (No. 7,096).
48. Using and selling the pencil was still infringement in 1793, but claiming only the
making of the pencil might have actually limited the patent.
49. FRANK GILBERT, JETHRO WOOD, INVENTOR OF THE MODERN PLOW 22 (1882) (first
emphasis added), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=wnIoAAAAYAAJ.
50. Based on the specification, which is amusingly verbose, we coded this particular
patent as both a method and a manufacture. The patent issued a mere seventeen days after Wood
signed his application. Jethro Wood was well-known for his invention of a plow with
replaceable parts. See id.
51. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318–323 (repealed 1836) [hereinafter 1793
Patent Act] (―And in the case of any machine, he shall fully explain the principle, and the
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manufactures were patentable but methods were not.52 Thus, as
discussed further below, early discussion of principles may have been
equated with ―methods,‖ such that discussions about principles of
machines were really discussions about methods of machine operation.
Methods of machine operation would usually be considered a ―process‖
now, especially given the expansive definition of ―process‖ in the
current patent statute.53
Additionally, many inventors claimed improvement in the ―art of
manufacturing‖ or the ―mode of performing action.‖ It is universally
accepted today that the word ―process‖ in the current patent act54
replaced the word ―art‖ in prior patent acts.55 Conventional usage also
implies that ―mode‖ means process.56 However, the patentees we
studied did not seem to have the same views. In many patents, ―art‖ and
―mode‖ improvements related to machines that were intended to
improve processes,57 and patentees rarely also described or claimed use
of the machines as separate process inventions. But sometimes they did,
which introduced further difficulty.
As a result of all these conventions, many patents simply describe
how to make and use a product without actually stating whether the
steps for making and using the product were the new process or whether
the product itself was the new machine or manufacture. This practice
made it very difficult to determine what it was that the inventors
actually thought they had invented. They may have thought they had
several modes in which he has contemplated the application of that principle or character, by
which it may be distinguished from other inventions‖); 1836 Patent Act § 6 (―[I]n case of any
machine, he shall fully explain the principle and the several modes in which he has
contemplated the application of that principle or character by which it may be distinguished
from other inventions . . . .‖).
52. Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History,
1550–1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1311–12 (2001) (citing Dollond‘s Case, 1 Carp. P. C. 28,
30 (C.P. 1758) and Boulton & Watt v. Bull, (1795) 126 Eng. Rep. 651 (C.P.) 662; 2 H. Bl. 463,
485); WALTERSCHEID, supra note 2, at 356.
53. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2011) (―[P]rocess means process, art or method, and includes
a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material‖)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
54. Id. at § 101; H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952); P.J. Federico, Commentary on the
New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1 (West 1954), reprinted in 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC‘Y
161, 176–78 (1993).
55. 1790 Patent Act § 1. As noted above, however, ―art‖ may well have been narrower
than ―process‖ in common parlance.
56. See, e.g., DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/mode (defining
―mode‖ as ―a manner of acting or doing; method; way‖).
57. The 1793 and 1836 Patent Acts make clear that disclosure is required of ―the several
modes in which he has contemplated the application‖ of a machine. Indeed, today‘s ―best mode‖
requirement is a vestige of this historical language, even though that term is used to apply to all
types of inventions, including processes. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
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invented new machines, new ways in which a machine might work, new
ways to make things using new and old machines in a different way, or
perhaps all three.
While some patents appeared to be methods of using new (or old)
machines, most did not. Following Corning v. Burden,58 we treated
most claims as non-methods unless it was clear that the invention was a
process and not just a thing. In Corning, the patentee59 described a new
process for making iron puddlers‘ balls (which were known) by using a
new machine. He claimed ―[t]he preparing of the puddlers‘ balls . . . by
causing them to pass between a revolving cylinder and a curved,
segmental trough adapted thereto, constructed and operating
substantially in the manner of that herein described . . . .‖60 His claim
was not so narrow, though. He also claimed the formation of puddlers‘
balls by ―causing the said balls to pass between vibrating, or
reciprocating, tables, surfaces, or plates, of iron . . . or between
vibrating, or reciprocating, curved surfaces, operating upon the same
principle, and producing a like result by analogous means.‖61
The United States Supreme Court held, however, that the claim
could not be for a process.62 Instead, the Court determined that a
patentable process is very narrow, and—surprisingly—that a process
could not be achieved with a machine:
It is for the discovery or invention of some practicable
method or means of producing a beneficial result or effect,
that a patent is granted, and not for the result or effect itself.
It is when the term process is used to represent the means
or method of producing a result that it is patentable, and it
will include all methods or means which are not effected by
mechanism or mechanical [combinations].63
Because Burden did not claim to discover the ―process‖ of purifying
iron, but only claimed to invent the ―mechanism,‖ the Court limited his
patent to the machine.64 Interestingly, Corning militates directly against
58. 56 U.S. 252, 268 (1854) (holding that claim pertained to specific machine, not general
process used by a machine: ―[I]t is well settled that a man cannot have a patent for the function
or abstract effect of a machine, but only for the machine which produces it. . . . It is clear that
Burden does not pretend to have discovered any new process by which cast iron is converted
into malleable iron[.]‖).
59. Patent 1890, to Henry Burden on Dec. 10, 1840.
60. Id. at p. 2 (col. 4:lns 47-54).
61. Id. (col. 4:lns 55-63).
62. Corning, 56 U.S. at 267–68.
63. Id. at 268 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 269. Another case, decided a year earlier, included similar language. Le Roy v.
Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (―A patent is not good for an effect, or the result of a certain
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a historical requirement that processes must use a machine to be
patentable; Corning held the exact opposite.
Despite the fact that it is cited for its holding with respect to
limitations on patentability,65 Corning was really about interpreting the
patent, and it would surely be decided differently today. Perhaps the
Court should have decided Corning differently at the time;66 in
Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, for example, the Supreme Court ruled
that a patentable process could include mechanical operations.67
Further, the 1952 Patent Act defines processes to include new uses of
machines.68
Nonetheless, Corning reflects other cases from the time on which
patentees may have relied,69 so we used Corning as a basis to err on the
side of not finding methods where a patentee claimed to effectuate some
end using a particular device, without making clear whether the patentee
was claiming a new method.
This was not the only patent where Burden claimed a machine for
performing a method. For example, Patent No. X8,515, to Henry
Burden on December 12, 1834, states, ―What I claim as my invention
and improvement is the method of forming the heads of nails or spikes
in a steel box as above described.‖ However, the introductory language
states that the patent is for ―a new and useful improvement in the
machinery for manufacturing wrought nails or spikes.‖ The diagrams
included with the patent are titled: ―Machine for heading spikes and
nails.‖ We coded this as a machine rather than a method. We called this,
and patents like it, a ―machine that does it‖ patent—the claim appears to
be for a method, but the method is simply the intended operation of the
machine.
process, as that would prohibit all other persons from making the same thing by any means
whatsoever.‖). Le Roy related, as so many cases did, to interpreting the patent; the majority held
that the patent was for machinery while the defense claimed that the patent was for a method of
making pipe. Compare id. at 176 (―The combination of the machinery is claimed, through which
the new property of lead was developed, as a part of the process in the structure of the pipes.‖),
with id. at 179 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (―They do not claim, as their invention or improvement,
any of the parts of the machinery, independently of the arrangement and combination set
forth.‖).
65. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972). But see Michael Risch,
Everything is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 601 (2008) (arguing that Corning is
misconstrued as subject matter case).
66. As discussed further below, Corning incorrectly followed the English tradition of
squeezing all methods into manufactures, because methods were not patentable in England.
67. 214 U.S. 366 (1909).
68. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006).
69. See, e.g., Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1123 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600)
(―[I]f new effects are produced by an old machine in its unaltered state, I apprehend that no
patent can be legally supported; for it is a patent for an effect only.‖).
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In many cases, introductory language such as ―[s]pecification of a
method of Making . . .‖70 made it easier to determine whether the
inventor intended to patent a process. The well-known case Merrill v.
Yeomans illustrates helpful specification and claim language.71 In
Merrill, the patentee claimed ―the above-described new manufacture of
hydrocarbon oils, . . . by treating them substantially as is hereinbefore
described.‖72 The Court held that this was a claim for a particular
method of creating the oils, and not for the oils themselves; this ruling
allowed others to create the same oils by another method without
infringing. The Court reached this conclusion for two primary reasons.
First, the claim refers to the process ―hereinbefore described.‖ Second,
the specification refers to the invention as the method, and not as the
oils themselves.73
For example, Patent No. X1,86574 in this study was for an
―improvement in the manufacturing of Pitch Forks.‖75 The patent first
states that: ―The characteristic principle is . . . that temper given to steel
for a proper spring.‖76 But then the inventor states: ―The forks being
made . . .‖ and describes a multi-pronged fork made with round or
square metal of any material that can be tempered.77 Finally, the
inventor describes that ―[i]t is to be tempered in the following
manner . . .‖ and that is all there is to the patent.78 After describing the
tempering process, the patent specification ends without a claim or
clarification. This patent is ambiguous—it could be for pitch forks made
from spring-tempered steel, or it could be for the method of making
pitch forks made from spring-tempered steel.
Because of the introductory language, we coded this as a method
despite our leaning toward finding non-methods. First, the introduction
makes clear that it is an improvement in manufacturing, not an
improved manufacture. Second, the ―characteristic principle‖ is the
tempering, as there were surely pitch forks at this time. Thus, this is a
better way to make a known thing by tempering the metal.79 Of course,
70. U.S. Patent No. X1,921 (granted May 6, 1813). Compare with U.S. Patent No. X2,143
(granted May 27, 1814) (―The invention of this improvement in the manufacturing of scythes
being a machine . . . .‖).
71. 94 U.S. 568 (1876) (determining whether patent claim covered method of
manufacture or manufacture itself).
72. Id. at 571 (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id. at 571–72.
74. U.S. Patent No. X1865 (granted Jan. 12, 1813).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. We also found that this did not transform matter to a different state or thing, as the
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the patentee implies that spring tempering was already known, so it was
probably obvious to spring temper pitch fork tines, but that is not our
concern here.
Similarly, Patent No. X109, to Benjamin Tyler on April 15, 1796,
states the patent is for a ―discovery . . . of an improvement in the mode
of cleaning . . . all manner of grain, a description of the machine
invented . . . .‖80 The patent begins: ―The operation of cleaning is
performed, by first . . . .‖81 What follows is a description of how the
machine cleaned the grain. We coded this both as a machine and as a
method using a machine.
C. Finding Business Methods
We then determined whether methods used a machine or involved a
transformation of matter to a different state or thing. We defined
―machine‖ broadly, including essentially anything with moving parts.
Determinations of transformations were more difficult, as some
have argued that just about anything can be a transformation, including
the motion of a curve ball.82 We did not use such a broad definition
because the Federal Circuit did not do so when it announced the
machine-or-transformation test. The court was explicit that a claimed
process must transform a particular article into a different state or thing
to satisfy the transformation prong of the test.83
Thus, two Supreme Court precedents guided us. The first case is
American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., which held that an
orange dipped in borax was not a new manufacture despite the
preservative nature of the combination.84 The Court held that such a
treatment left the orange no different than it was.85
The second case is the one on which the Federal Circuit relied in
forming the machine-or-transformation test, Gottschalk v. Benson,

tempered steel is still steel.
80. U.S. Patent No. X109 (granted Apr. 15, 1796).
81. Id.
82. See Gerald N. Magliocca, Patenting the Curve Ball: Business Methods and Industry
Norms, 2009 BYU L. REV. 875, 876 (2009).
83. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff‟d but criticized sub nom. Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
84. 283 U.S. 1, 14 (1931).
85. Id. at 11–12 (―Addition of borax to the rind of natural fruit does not produce from the
raw material an article for use which possesses a new or distinctive form, quality, or
property . . . . It remains a fresh orange, fit only for the same beneficial uses as theretofore.‖).
There were process claims at issue in Brogdex, but the Court assumed them to be patentable. Id.
at 13. See also Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 643 (3d Cir. 1928) (holding
that tungsten was not patentable when it retained its basic features when purified).
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which discusses transforming an article to ―a different state or thing.‖86
In Gottschalk, the Supreme Court quoted examples of processes
described in Corning v. Burden,87 and noted: ―Those are instances,
however, where the use of chemical substances or physical acts, such as
temperature control, changes articles or materials.‖88
The Gottschalk Court further analyzed five cases to define
―transformation‖: Cochrane v. Deener,89 Tilghman v. Proctor,90
Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford,91 Smith v. Snow,92 and Waxham v.
Smith.93 Cochrane related to a process in which flour was ground into a
fine powder.94 Tilghman involved a chemical interaction between fat
and water.95 Expanded Metal considered whether a process could be
patentable even if performed by a machine, and allowed patentability of
processes involving ―mechanical operations.‖96 Furthermore, in
Expanded Metal, the metal was cut and stretched so as to form a
lattice,97 and was thus transformed into something different. Smith v.
Snow and Waxham v. Smith were related cases in which eggs were
incubated and hatched,98 creating a new life form. All of these cases
involved transformation of matter to a different state or thing; none of
them involved esoteric transformations such as curve balls.
The implication of the Brogdex and Gottschalk Courts‘ discussions
is that ―transformation‖ means a chemical or mechanical change to a
different state or thing and not just a combination of two things without
any such change or a treatment that leaves something the same as it
was. Accordingly, there are several patents that we did not code as
transformations because they left the products unchanged.
Finally, we coded for business methods. We did not limit ourselves
to information patents only, but instead included all patents that were
86. 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972).
87. 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853) (―One may discover a new and useful improvement in the
process of tanning, dyeing, &c., irrespective of any particular form of machinery or mechanical
device.‖).
88. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 69.
89. 94 U.S. 780 (1876).
90. 102 U.S. 707 (1880).
91. 214 U.S. 366 (1909).
92. 294 U.S. 1 (1935).
93. 294 U.S. 20 (1935).
94. Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 785.
95. Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 729.
96. Expanded Metal, 214 U.S. at 385–86. Note that the Court did not rule that a
transformation to a different state or thing was required; its discussion of examples used in
precedent (like a process for folding paper) implied that it was an open question, but that it need
not reach an answer. Id. at 384–85.
97. Id. at 374.
98. Smith, 294 U.S. at 3; Waxham, 294 U.S. at 22–23.
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not particularly technological, which swept in patents such as a method
for exercise using a rocking chair. Most business methods we found
dealt with ways to manipulate information, including methods of
measurement, writing or drawing, or teaching.
The methodology discussed above should make clear that while the
coding methodology is reproducible and not entirely subjective, there is
room to nitpick about coding particular patents. However, changing a
few categorizations should not affect the results of the study
significantly. The number of observations and percentages in each
category are sufficient to support this Article‘s conclusions.
D. Insights from Interpreting Early Patents
The ambiguous nature of early patent ―claiming‖ leads to an
important insight about how to interpret judicial opinions and
commentary from the period. Most early cases stating that ―principles‖
are not patentable were not patentable subject matter opinions; instead,
they were attempts to determine what the patent covered. 99 In short,
judges were often not opining as to what could be patented in general;
they were trying to determine what was patented in a particular case.
Specific cases will be discussed below, but trouble understanding
vague or ambiguous patenting was not limited to judges. For example,
Patent No. X5,451, to Luther Davis on April 14, 1829, is titled ―manner
of mortising and making tenons on the ends of the spokes of
wheels . . . where a square or quadrangular mortice and tenon have
heretofore been used.‖ The patent shows a hollow boring device used to
make round pegs that fit into round holes, rather than square joints. The
Journal of the Franklin Institute reported on the patent, stating:
No particular claim is made. Instruments similar to
the hollow auger have been in use from a remote
period, and as no particular structure, or indeed any
structure, of the auger is described, the patent, of
course, is not for this; for what it is, we must leave
others to determine.100
This insight connecting principles to patent construction is
important for understanding modern patentable subject matter debates.
The supposed long-standing refusal by courts to patent natural
99. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1768 (noting the connection between
―principles‖ cases and early central claiming style.).
100. 3 List of American Patents Granted in April, 1829, With Remarks and
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 4 J. FRANKLIN INST. 42, 56 (1829), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=d7pIAAAAMAAJ&pg=RA1-PA56.
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principles101 is not supported by historical statements and practices of
courts. Historic statements that principles are not patentable seem to
have been a side issue, rather than a direct consideration of the nature of
patentable subject matter.102
1. Principles in English Common Law
Early judicial reliance on English law to interpret American patent
law emphasized non-analogous statutory language, and continues to
create historical confusion when those cases are read today. Early
nineteenth-century cases and treatises that referred to the unpatentability
of principles in the English common law miss an important difference
from American law: Methods were patentable in the United States, but
not in England.103 The English Statute of Monopolies only extended to
―manufactures.‖
Because methods were not patentable in England, a patent that
described a new process to make an old thing or any process that found
a new use for an old thing was suspect.104 Furthermore, this meant that
any patent claiming such a method was consistently compared with
principles. The case of Boulton v. Bull is illustrative.105 There, the court
struggled with the treatment of James Watt‘s steam engine because the
patent called the invention a ―method.‖106 Justice Eyre discussed
methods patents, like a method of preventing fire by putting iron plates
in a building:
Now let the merit of the invention be what it may, it is
evident that the patent in almost all these cases cannot be
granted for the means by which it acts, for in them there is
nothing new, and in some of them nothing capable of
appropriation. . . . In Hartley‟s case [of preventing fires], it
could not be for the effect produced, because the
101. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (―[T]hese exceptions have
defined the reach of the statute as a matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years.‖).
102. See Risch, supra note 65, at 612–21 (discussing repetition of judicial statements about
natural principles that were never applied to invalidate a patent).
103. Mossoff, supra note 52, at 1311–12 (discussing that the debate in Boulton & Watt v.
Bull was in part about whether patent covered manufacture, which was patentable at the time, or
method, which was not); WALTERSCHEID, supra note 2, at 356.
104. See Boulton & Watt v. Bull, (1795) 126 Eng. Rep. 651 (C.P.) 666; 2 H. Bl. 463, 492–
93 (Eyre C.J.) (―Upon this ground Dollond‟s patent was perhaps exceptionable, for that was for
a method of producing a new object glass, rather than being the object glass produced. If Dr.
James‟s patent had been for his method of preparing his powders, instead of the powders
themselves, that patent would have been exceptionable upon the same ground.‖).
105. Id.
106. See generally id. (discussing whether a method could be patented as if it were a
completely new invention).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 5 [2012], Art. 4

1298

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

effect . . . is
merely
negative,
though
it
was
meritorious. . . . [T]here are several [patents] for new
methods of manufacturing articles in common use, where
the sole merit and the whole effect produced, are the saving
of time and expence, and thereby lowering the price of the
article . . . [Y]et the validity of these patents . . . must rest
upon the same foundation as that of Mr. Hartley‘s. The
patent cannot be for the effect produced, for it is either no
substance at all, or . . . no new substance, but an old one,
produced advantageously for the public. It cannot be for the
mechanism, for there is no new mechanism employed. It
must then be for the method; and I would say . . . it must be
for method detached from all physical existence
whatever.107
It appears that Justice Eyre was criticizing Justice Buller‘s apparent
view in the same case that anything that was not a new manufacture was
necessarily an unpatentable method.108 Eyre seems to disagree
somewhat. Nonetheless, this quote illustrates two points. First, for at
least some British judges, there was no middle ground. Either the patent
was for a thing or embodied in a thing, which was patentable, or it was
for nothing, and thus unpatentable. A method was necessarily ―detached
from all physical existence whatsoever.‖ Any patent that did not
embrace a thing was necessarily an unpatentable principle.
Second, it illustrates that British courts discussed principles with
respect to patent construction just as American courts did later. As
Justice Eyre later noted in upholding Watt‘s patent:
An improper use of the word principle in the specification
set forth in this case, has I think, served to puzzle it.
Undoubtedly there can be no patent for a mere principle,
but for a principle so far embodied and connected with
corporeal substances as to be in a condition to act, and to
produce effects in any art, trade, mystery, or manual
occupation, I think there may be a patent.109
107. Id. at 666–67; 2 H. Bl. at 4994 (Eyre C.J.).
108. Id. at 663; 2 H. Bl. at 486 (―The method and the mode of doing a thing are the same:
and I think it impossible to support a patent for a method only, without having carried it into
effect and produced some new substance.‖) (Buller J.).
109. Id. at 667; 2 H. Bl. at 495 (Eyre C.J.). The quote continues: ―It is not that the patentee
has conceived an abstract notion, that the consumption of steam in fire engines may be lessened,
but he has discovered a practical manner of doing it . . . . Surely this is a very different thing
from taking a patent for a principle; it is not for a principle, but for a process.‖ Id. at 667; 2 H.
Bl. at 495–96.
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Even as English courts warmed to the idea that a method might be
patentable despite not making something new, the judges continued to
define abstract principles in terms of things that were not
manufactures.110 This meant that patentability turned on whether the
method was really a manufacture, which turned on ―production‖ from
the application of principles using some specific equipment. Fortunately
for patentees, courts were willing to consider most methods such a
production.111 As Justice Eyre noted in Bull: ―And I think we should
well consider what we do in this case, that we may not shake the
foundation upon which these [valuable method-like] patents stand.‖112
This dichotomous treatment of methods as either unpatentable
principles or patentable manufactures left the law in England very
unclear, making it even more difficult to determine what inventors were
claiming in their patents.113
Unlike the laws of England, which limited patents to manufactures,
the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution authorized
Congress to create laws to promote the progress of the ―useful arts.‖114
Thus, early American statutes115implicitly allowed, and today‘s
statute116explicitly allows, methods even if the method was not carried
out in the form of a particular machine.
110. Rex v. Wheeler, (1819) 106 Eng. Rep. 392 (K.B.) 394–95; 2 B. & Ald. 345, 349–50
(Abbott C.J.) (―Now the word ―manufactures‖ has been generally understood to denote either a
thing made, which is useful for its own sake, and vendible as such, . . . or to mean an engine or
instrument, or some part of an engine or instrument, to be so employed, either in the making of
some previously known article, or in some other useful purpose. . . . Or it may perhaps extend
also to a new process to be carried on by known implements, or elements, acting upon known
substances, and ultimately producing some other known substance, but producing it in a cheaper
or more expeditious manner. . . . But no merely philosophical or abstract principle can answer
the word manufactures. Something of a corporeal and substantial nature, something that can be
made by man from the matters subjected to his art and skill, or at the least some new mode of
employing practically his art and skill . . . is requisite to satisfy this word. A person, therefore,
who applies to the Crown for a patent, may represent himself to be the inventor of some new
thing, or of some new engine or instrument.‖).
111. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 2, at 356 (―Fortunately for [Watt] two of [the judges] were
prepared to accept the view that his specification taught more than merely the application of a
principle of nature.‖); see also Rex at 339 n.231 (Buller, J.) (―A patent must be for some new
production from those elements, not the elements themselves.‖).
112. 126 Eng. Rep. at 667; 2 H. Bl. at 494.
113. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 2, at 356 (―If at the end of the century it had become the
common law that ‗any manner of new manufactures‘ as used in the Statute encompassed
improvement inventions but did not cover principles of nature (although there would remain
considerable dispute as to what constituted a principle of nature), there was mass confusion as to
the extent to which this phrase covered so-called ‗method‘ or ‗process‘ inventions.‖).
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
115. The 1790 Act explicitly allowed improvement in the ―art.‖ 1790 Patent Act § 1.
116. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006) (―‗[P]rocess‘ means process, art or method, and includes a
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Despite these fundamental differences, early American courts
looked to English law for aid in construing patents, and in doing so
muddled the analysis. Contemporaneous treatises demonstrate the
confusion. For example, treatise author Willard Phillips devoted several
pages to discussing the unpatentability of methods, but every case he
cited for that proposition was English.117
Fessenden‘s treatise is also illustrative. Thomas Green Fessenden,
himself an inventor, wrote the first American patent treatise. In his first
edition, from 1810, there is no mention of a limitation on methods: ―A
patent may be obtained for a new invented method of producing a useful
effect.‖118 In his second edition, from 1822, Fessenden cited new
American cases for the proposition that manufactures in the British
statute are synonymous with ―new and useful art, machine, manufacture
or composition of matter.‖119 He also removed the statement about
general patentability of methods. Thus, the original understanding of the
statute was narrowed based on attempts to shoehorn the American
statute into the English statute.
Even as late as 1853, in O‟Reilly v. Morse,120 the United States
Supreme Court cited to Neilson v. Harford,121 an English case
supposedly holding that principles were not patentable. But the Neilson
court was worried about interpreting the patent as well, because it
looked like a patent for a method. As Baron Parke noted:
Then we come to the question itself, which depends on the
proper construction to be put on the specification . . . . [I]t
becomes necessary to examine what the nature of the
invention is which the plaintiff has disclosed by this
instrument. It is very difficult to distinguish it from the
specification of a patent for a principle; and this at first
created in the minds of some of the Court, much difficulty;
but after full consideration, we think that the plaintiff does
not merely claim a principle, but a machine embodying a
principle, and a very valuable one.122
Because ―method‖ implied ―principle‖ in England, the Neilson court
needed to find a machine rather than a method in order to validate the

new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.‖).
117. PHILLIPS, supra note 26, at 82–95.
118. FESSENDEN (1810), supra note 27, at 188.
119. FESSENDEN (1822), supra note 27, at 365.
120. 56 U.S. 62, 114 (1853).
121. (1841) 151 Eng. Rep. 1266 (Ex.); 8 M. & W. 806.
122. Neilson, 151 Eng. Rep. at 1273; 8 M. & W. at 823.
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patent.123 The patent specification describes a very specific way to carry
out the method124—far more specific than the broad claim to all printed
electromagnetic communications rejected in Morse.125 Thus, when
viewed from an ―abstract‖ principle perspective, it is difficult to see
why the Neilson court even entertained an argument that the patent was
for a principle. However, when considered from a patent construction
viewpoint—whether the patent was for a method or a manufacture—it
is quite clear why the Neilson court discussed ―principles.‖
In sum, it appears that American and British courts agreed on a
universal rule that abstract principles like ―gravity‖ cannot be patented.
Of course, this is not surprising because such principles are not
machines, manufactures, compositions of matter, or even methods. But
beyond this agreement, American reliance on English law and its
somewhat peculiar ―manufacture only‖ rule led judges on this side of
the Atlantic to focus on the machine or composition when discussing
principles and methods.126 Early patentees deepened the confusion by
failing to make clear whether they had invented a machine or a
method.127 Even now, judicial focus on methods embodied in machines
continues.128
123. Methods were not considered patentable until 1842. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 2,
at 358 n.211.
124. Neilson, (1841) 151 Eng. Rep. at 1267; 8 M. & W. at 807 (―The blast or current of air
so produced is to be passed from the bellows or blowing apparatus into an air-vessel or
receptacle, made sufficiently strong to endure the blast, and through and from that vessel or
receptacle by means of a tube, pipe, or aperture into the fire, forge, or furnace. The air-vessel or
receptacle must be air-tight, or nearly so, except the apertures for the admission and emission of
the air. . . . The air-vessel or receptacle may be conveniently made of iron, but as the effect does
not depend upon the nature of the material, other metals or convenient materials may be used.‖).
125. Cf. Risch, Everything is Patentable, supra note 65, at 601 (arguing that Morse is like
Corning: ―[I]f a particular means for achieving an end is invented, then the means may be
patented, but the general end may not be patented if it is not new.‖).
126. Prager, supra note 2, at 256 (arguing that Justice Story knew that English law was
different than American law, but used English law regardless in an attempt to narrow the
meaning of ―art‖ in the statute); see Lubar, supra note 2, at 939 (arguing that Justice Story
disfavored patents in his early years); see, e.g., Barrett v. Hall, 2 F. Cas. 914, 925 (C.C.D. Mass.
1818) (citing English cases for the proposition that ―the patent should be for the combined
machinery, or improvements on the old machine, and not for a mere mode or device for
producing such effects, detached from the machinery,‖ while explicitly recognizing that the
American statute is not as limited as the English statute). I have argued elsewhere that courts
have attached too much weight to Justice Story‘s early views in the face of statutory change. See
Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1195, 1238.
127. Prager, supra note 2, at 257 (―Story invoked the supposed rule against ‗mere
principles‘ also when confronted with a machine patent which for some reason seemed to him
too broad or vague.‖); see, e.g., Stone v. Sprague, 23 F. Cas. 161, 161–62 (C.C.D.R.I. 1840)
(―[A]lthough the language is not without some ambiguity, the true interpretation of it is, that the
patentee limits his invention to the specific machinery‖ because patent claiming process using
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The differences, though, suggest that American courts‘ nuance-free
reliance on English cases was, and is, inconsistent with the letter and
intent of early patent acts,129 as well as the current one. For example, in
Howe v. Abbott,130 Justice Joseph Story explicitly held that new uses of
known processes were unpatentable methods: ―The application of an old
process to manufacture an article, to which it had never before been
applied, is not a patentable invention.‖131
This view was expressly rejected by the drafters of the 1952 Patent
Act,132 to make clear that patent statutes had always allowed patenting
of novel uses of known processes.133 Of course, the claimed new use
must be novel and nonobvious; to some extent, cases like Howe are
really obviousness cases at a time before nonobviousness was a patent
criterion. This only exacerbates the confusion when such cases are
discussed as if they are intended to limit patentable subject matter.134
Despite early cases‘ continued reference to English law, Howe was
one of the few early American cases that invalidated a patent relying on
any machinery to achieve it would necessarily be void as abstract principle or attempt to claim
future improvements others made).
128. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc‘ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(―Whether stated implicitly or explicitly, we consider the scope of § 101 to be the same
regardless of the form— machine or process—in which a particular claim is drafted. . . . Thus,
we are comfortable in applying our reasoning in Alappat and State Street to the method claims
at issue in this case.‖), overruled on other grounds, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3224
(2010).
129. Cf. Menell, supra note 19, at 1294 (―The early treatise writers recognized that U.S.
patent law extended to ‗art‘ so as to avoid the problem that English courts had in according
protection to manufacturing processes under a statute directed to ―new manufactures.‖).
130. 12 F. Cas. 656, 656 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842).
131. Id. at 658. Cf. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 177 (1852) (―If it is old and well
known, and applied only to a new purpose, that does not make it patentable.‖) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bean v. Smallwood, 2 F. Cas. 1142, 1143 (C.C.D. Mass.
1843)).
132. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006) (defining ―process‖ as new use for process, machine, or
manufacture, among other things).
133. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952); Federico, supra note 54, at 176–78. Even the
statements in Le Roy were reversed later in the same case. Le Roy v. Tatham, 63 U.S. 132, 139
(1859) (―If it be admitted that the machinery, or a part of it, was not new when used to produce
the new product, still it was so combined and modified as to produce new results, within the
patent law. One new and operative agency in the production of the desired result would give
novelty to the entire combination.‖).
134. Risch, supra note 65, at 598 (arguing historic subject matter cases were really based
on concerns relating to other patentability criteria). Cf. Kristen Osenga, Ants, Elephant Guns,
and Statutory Subject Matter, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1087, 1091–92 (2007) (―The Patent Office and
some commentators are using § 101 rejections as a means to avoid tackling other policy or
practical issues that should be handled through other avenues. The rejections thus serve as
proxies for inquiries that are made more appropriately under other requirements of patentability,
such as utility, novelty, nonobviousness, adequate written description, and enablement.‖).
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British law. Thus, the repetition of quotations and examples from
England led to steady growth of doctrine that was neither applicable nor
applied to American patents in the early nineteenth century.135 Neither
American inventors nor even the Patent Office believed patents were so
limited; for example, the Patent Office examined the application in
Howe under the 1836 Patent Act, yet still granted the patent.
The lasting effect of this confusion is our current misinterpretation
of early American judicial discussion of principles of the invention,136 a
confusion that is evident when reading the patents that inventors
actually sought, which were rarely, if ever, for truly abstract
principles.137 This misinterpretation leads many courts and
commentators today to consider whether methods (and even machines)
are cloaked ―principles,‖138 even though they are clearly not the type of
ephemeral, abstract principles that all agree are unpatentable.139 This

135. Prager, supra note 2, at 257 (―There was nothing whatever in the statute which called
for anti-method law and hardly anything very conclusive which called for the remainder of the
anti-principle dicta.‖).
136. See Nicholas J. Szabo, Elemental Subject Matter 10 (Jan. 10, 2006) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=936326 (arguing that courts should return to
the rule from Neilson).
137. It was so rare, in fact, that the first American treatise did not even mention it until
courts started doing so. Compare FESSENDEN (1810), supra note 27, at 189 (―A patent may be
maintained for a principle so far embodied with corporeal substances as to be in a condition to
act and to produce useful effects, in any art, trade, mystery, or manual occupation.‖), with
FESSENDEN (1822), supra note 27, at 369 (―There can be no patent for a mere principle, or
elementary truth, but for a principle so far embodied and connected with corporeal substances as
to be in a condition to act, and to produce effects, in any art, trade, mystery, or occupation, there
may be a patent.‖ (emphasis added)).
138. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3239–40 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(arguing that American subject matter principles should be based on English ―backdrop‖
without noting differing statutory language); id. at 3243 (suggesting that ―art‖ means
―manufactures‖); id. at 3246 (―But we consistently focused the inquiry on whether an ‗art‘ was
connected to a machine or physical transformation, an inquiry that would have excluded
methods of doing business.‖).
139. Not every court looked through the physical to reject patents. Even as business
methods were being viewed with more hostility, many courts upheld patents for physical objects
that would likely be considered business methods today. See, e.g., Carter Crume Co. v. Am.
Sales Book Co., 124 F. 903, 903–04 (C.C.W.D.N.Y. 1903) (affirming patent for folded sales
book that allowed for carbon copies); Safeguard Account Co. v. Wellington, 86 F. 146, 148
(C.C.D. Mass. 1898) (affirming account book with perforated pages to allow partial page to be
used to record information on later pages); Johnson v. Johnston, 60 F. 618, 620 (C.C.W.D. Pa.
1894) (affirming patent for index book with particular alphabetical tables); Thomson v.
Citizens‘ Nat‘l Bank of Fargo, 53 F. 250, 254 (8th Cir. 1892) (affirming patent for accounting
book that moved last column to next page); Dugan v. Gregg, 48 F. 227, 228 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1891) (affirming book with removable index); Norrington v. Merchants‘ Nat‘l Bank, 25 F. 199,
200–01 (C.C.D.R.I. 1885) (affirming patent for checkbook that includes check register).
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was not the context in the early nineteenth century,140 and it is no
wonder that courts and commentators now struggle to define patentable
subject matter tests based on inapposite law.141
2. Using Principles to Explain Inventions
Apart from application of non-analogous English law, early courts
also tried to identify the principles of patents to determine what had
been invented.142 Early rules that the patent specification could not
reference the drawings made this more difficult.143 The statute required,
though, that patentees describe the principles of their machine
inventions.144 The purpose, in part, was to not limit a patentee to the
specific machine described in the patent specification.145 At least two
problems arose from this approach. First, patentees used new principles
to develop machines that were barely different from existing machines.
Second, patentees used preexisting principles applied in repurposed
machines in different fields.
The courts dealt with these problems in two notable ways. First, in
cases like Whittemore v. Cutter,146 Justice Story pronounced a
requirement that combination and improvement patents must identify
how the claimed machines differed from the prior art.147 It was under
this requirement that Evans v. Eaton148 invalidated a patent obtained in
1808 in part because it did not sufficiently identify the novel
140. See, e.g., OLIVER EVANS, EXPOSITION OF PART OF THE PATENT LAW 13 (1816) (―[T]he
fundamental principles [e.g. gravity] may be few. We know that they cannot be invented or
created by man; they have co-existed with eternity; and are common stock, but may be
discovered by study and ingenuity, and variously applied to useful purposes, by labour and
expense, which constitutes inherent, exclusive right. The mechanist knows in the application of
which of them, he has discovered an improvement, to improve any art, manufacture, or
machine, either to produce equal beneficial effects, at a less expense, or a greater beneficial
effect in a given time, or a more perfect and more beneficial result. In either of these cases he
knows that he has made an improvement in the principle, within the meaning of the 2d section
of the act . . . .‖).
141. Prager, supra note 2, at 258 (―The result is that method applications and method
patents, while clearly and unrestrictedly approved by the statute, encounter peculiar kinds of
trouble before many, if not all, of the patent tribunals of our time.‖); Risch, supra note 65, at
649 (―[A]lthough subject matter restriction can be a ‗policy lever,‘ it is not a very effective lever
because the rules cannot be applied narrowly or consistently.‖).
142. Lutz, supra note 20, at 135 (―In passing upon a specification of this kind, the courts
attempted to extract its ‗principle.‘‖).
143. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 9, at 255–56.
144. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318 (1793).
145. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 2, at 359.
146. 29 F. Cas. 1123 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
147. Id. at 1124.
148. 20 U.S. 356 (1822).
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improvement.149 Even this part of the decision was reached only
because of ambiguity about whether the inventor was claiming the
entire machine or just an improvement.150
The rule from Evans became etched in patent-description practice.
For example, in later discussion of patent specifications, the Journal of
the Franklin Institute assumed that when no claim was made in a patent,
it meant that the patentee thought the whole patent description was
novel subject matter.151 If the patentee included a claim, then the novel
invention was a particular portion of the described subject matter.
Thus, courts sought to determine the principles upon which
patentees were describing and claiming their patents to determine
whether the principles were original to the inventor, whether the
application of the principles was original, or whether there was an
improvement on known principles and applications.152 As the Court
noted in Evans: ―If [the machines in the patent and the prior art] were
the same in principle, and merely differed in form and proportion, then
it was declared that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover . . . .‖153

149. Id. at 370, 434.
150. Id. at 432–33.
151. See List of American Patents Which Issued in May, 1833, With Remarks and
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 12 J. FRANKLIN INST. 309, 321 (1834) (discussing Patent
X7,591, to Daniel Williams on May 22, 1833), available at http://books.google.com/
books?id=cBIGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA321. ―We presume that there is much of novelty in the
affair; and the patentee appears to think it altogether new, as he has not made any claim, either
particular or general.‖ Id.
152. Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1124 (―The jury then are to decide, whether the principles of
Mr. Whittemore‘s machine are altogether new, or whether his machine be an improvement only
on those, which have been in use before his invention. I have before observed, that the
principles are the mode of operation. If the same effects are produced by two machines by the
same mode of operation, the principles of each are the same.‖). This requirement melded some
with what we might call obviousness: ―It will not be sufficient, to protect the plaintiff‘s patent
that this specific machine, with all its various combinations and effects, did not exist before; for
if the different effects were all produced by the same application of machinery, in separate parts,
and he merely combined them together, or added a new effect, such combination would not
sustain the present patent . . . .‖ Id.
153. Evans, 20 U.S. at 431; see also Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019–20 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568) (―It has been often decided, that a patent cannot be legally obtained for
a mere philosophical or abstract theory; it can only be for such a theory reduced to practice in a
particular structure or combination of parts. In short, the patent must be for a specific machine,
substantially new in its structure and mode of operation, and not merely changed in form, or in
the proportion of its parts.‖).
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Justice Story may have explained it best in Barrett v. Hall:154
[C]are should be taken to distinguish, what is meant by a
principle. In the minds of some men, a principle means an
elementary truth, or power; so that in the view of such men,
all machines, which perform their appropriate functions by
motion, in whatever way produced, are alike in principle,
since motion is the element employed. No one, however, in
the least acquainted with law, would for a moment contend,
that a principle in this sense is the subject of a patent; and if
it were otherwise, it would put an end to all patents for all
machines, which employed motion, for this has been
known as a principle, or elementary power, from the
beginning of time. The true legal meaning of the principle
of a machine, with reference to the patent act, is the
peculiar structure or constituent parts of such machine. And
in this view the question may be very properly
asked . . . whether the principles of two machines be the
same or different. Now, the principles of two machines
may be the same, although the form or proportions may be
different. They may substantially employ the same power
in the same way, though the external mechanism be
apparently different . . . . On the other hand, the principles
of two machines may be very different, although their
external structure may have great similarity in many
respects.155
This passage illustrates that patents for truly abstract principles were
simply an unheard of phenomenon.156 Instead, seeking to understand the
principles of the invention was important to determining novelty and
infringement. The end of the quote shows how modern notions of
obviousness and infringement by the doctrine of equivalents were at
their core based on analysis of inventive principles. Further, this portion
of Barrett discussing principles is completely disconnected, by several
154. 2 F. Cas. 914 (C.C.D. Mass. 1818).
155. Id. at 923 .
156. It also relates to an ongoing debate about whether a programmed general purpose
computer is a ―new‖ machine even though the parts are the same as the unprogrammed
computer. This quote seems to support the notion that the ―principle‖ of the computer can
change with its software, even if the physical components are the same. See, e.g., In re Alappat,
33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (1994), overruled on other grounds, by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (―We have held that such programming creates a new machine, because a general purpose
computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer once it is programmed to perform
particular functions pursuant to instructions from program software.‖).
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paragraphs and a clear break in discussion, from any discussion about
patentability of methods.157 In short, discussion of principles (even
abstract ones) had nothing to do with whether a method was patentable.
Principles were about patent construction, and methods were about
interpreting the English statute.
In addition to determining whether the patent covered an
improvement or not, courts also considered the principles of inventions
to determine what the invention was in the first place. For example, in
Whitney v. Carter, a case involving the cotton gin, the court attempted
to determine whether prior machines invalidated Eli Whitney‘s patent
due to lack of novelty.158 To make this determination, the trial court had
to first decide what the invention was, and the court
agreed with the plaintiff‘s counsel that the legal title to a
patent consists, not in a principle merely, but in an
application of a principle, whether previously in existence
or not, to some new and useful purpose. And [the judge]
was also of opinion that the principle of Mr. Whitney‘s
machine was entirely new . . . .159
While the court noted that principles were not patentable, the statement
was merely an aside to the important question in the case: how the
patentee applied the principles and whether the prior art applied the
same principles.
There is surely still a place for identifying and excluding abstract
principles from patentability. This history implies that the proper place
is during claim construction—determining what the patentee invented
by identifying the application of the principles described in the patent,
just as judges did more than two hundred years ago. The difficulty, of
course, is that peripheral claiming is so specific that some claims may
not be an application of the principle but, instead, the principle itself,
and those claims are likely invalid.160 Then again, a principle with no
application is probably not a machine, manufacture, composition of
matter, or process, nor is it practically useful.161 Either way, the issue is
one of claim construction: determining what the patentee is claiming by
comparing it with the abstract principle.

157. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
158. 29 F. Cas. 1070 (C.C.D. Ga. 1810).
159. Id. at 1072–73.
160. See Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1342–43 (2011).
161. See Michael Risch, A Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57,
74–75 (2011).
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II. EARLY PATENTS
This Part presents some summary data and representative
descriptions of America‘s first patents. One prior study has examined
patenting by geographic region and industrial category,162 but none has
looked at all the specific inventions from a legal perspective. Further,
while some writers have referred to sporadic business methods
throughout history,163 no one has completed a comprehensive survey of
early business methods patents.
A. Technology Classes
A look at the technology classes the USPTO assigned to early
patents sheds some light on the types of patents early U.S. inventors
sought. The USPTO has assigned modern classifications to these old
patents. To be sure, patent classification is notoriously vague, and the
sweeping categories assigned to old patents are even broader. Even so,
the general categories will show areas of concentration and obvious
gaps.
The following Table shows the top twelve patent classifications of
historical patents.
Table 1: Top Twelve Historical Patent Classifications
Class
126
460
241
144
172
83
19
57
68
114
100
415

Description
Stoves and Furnaces
Crop Threshing or Separating
Solid Material Disintegration
Woodworking
Earth Working
Cutting
Textile Fiber Preparation
Textile Spinning and Twisting
Textile Fluid Treating
Ships
Presses
Rotary Fluid Motors and
Pumps

Count
245
132
120
107
104
100
87
73
59
57
55
52

Percent
6.58%
3.54%
3.22%
2.87%
2.79%
2.68%
2.33%
1.96%
1.58%
1.53%
1.48%
1.40%

162. See generally Sokoloff, supra note 3 (analyzing data of patent type by region and
other geographical influences).
163. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J., dissenting), aff‟d but
criticized sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss5/4

30

Risch: America’s First Patents

2012]

AMERICA‟S FIRST PATENTS

1309

The categories are the types one might expect from this time period.
They are consistent with categories found in other studies of early
patenting.164 It is important to note how small each category is. The
most used classification represents only 6.5% of the patents, and the
twelfth largest represents only 1.4% of the patents. In total, the patents
we examined in this study represent 227 primary classifications.
The classifications above represent patents that survived the 1836
fire. The index allows for a count of certain subjects for every patent.
For example, 516 patents related to mills, 496 involved steam, and 236
improved plows. Another 381 patents were for some improvement on
stoves. A total of 180 patents involved pumps, and 66 patents related to
tanning leather. New machines for washing clothes and dishes (mostly
clothes) accounted for another 267 patents. Movement was also
important during this time: 213 patents related to propelling something
and another 79 harnessed horse power. So was cutting things, with 471
patents relating to this task. Spinning thread was also popular, showing
192 patents, in addition to 188 cloth patents in the index. Manufacturing
materials were relevant as well, claiming 145 brick-related patents and
126 wood-related patents.
An 1823 Patent Office report provides some useful information
about the types of patents inventors sought.165 The report lists the types
of models in the Patent Office. Because the Patent Office did not require
models for every invention, the list is also helpful to see the types of
inventions that did require models.

164. See Sokoloff, supra note 3.
165. See Report on the Patent Office for 1823, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
PATENTS 1790–36, VOL. 1, available at http://www.myoutbox.net/poar1823.htm.
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Table 2: Number of Models by Type166
Nail cutting machines
95
Pumps
66
Ploughs
65
Presses
56
Looms
45
Propelling boats
38
Spinning machines
28
Water wheels
26
Saw mills
26
Winnowing machines
25
Thrashing machines
20
Water mills
17
Cloth shearing machines
16
Steam mills
14
Bridges
13
Locks
12
Fire engines
10
Straw cutting machines
10
Carding machines
8
Wind mills
7
Mud machines
7
Flax dressing machines
6
File cutting machines
6
Machines for cutting Dye-Woods
6
Making carriage wheels
4
Stocking looms
3
Boring machines
3
Guns
2
Machines for making barrels, &c.
1
Subtotal
635
For various other purposes
1,184
Total
1,819
By 1823, nearly 3,800 patents had issued, which means that nearly
2,000 patents were not associated with a model.
The Patent Office has now assigned 560 patents (about 15%) to
Class 1. Patent Class 1 is reserved for classifications that are no longer
valid in today‘s system.167 One interpretation of this fact is that many
166. Id.
167. See Examiner‟s Handbook Chapter 2: Aids to Searching or Placement, U.S. PATENT
& TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/classification/handbook/two.jsp
(last visited Jan. 16, 2012).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss5/4

32

Risch: America’s First Patents

AMERICA‟S FIRST PATENTS

2012]

1311

patents are for particular sub-technologies that are now obsolete.
Examples of patents in this class are particular types of bedsteads, bee
hives, methods of writing and teaching, making boots and shoes,
churns, cooking stoves, cotton gins, cutting and shearing, furnaces,
horse power, bridge construction, raising water, making four-tined
forks, propelling boats or machinery (with steam, primarily), sawing,
and tanning.
This does not mean that none of these types of patents are in the
classification system. Rather, the specific subject of the patent no longer
has a subclass.
B. Exemplary and Interesting Patents
A few examples of important and interesting early inventions may
be illuminating. An early example is Patent No. X72, issued to Eli
Whitney on March 14, 1794, for the cotton gin. This is the seventh
oldest patent to survive the 1836 fire. Interestingly, this patent was not
subject to examination, but the historical record suggests that Thomas
Jefferson asked for a model, and was also personally interested in how
well it might work.168 Some people dispute whether Eli Whitney
himself invented the cotton gin, or whether it was novel at all,169 which
are two claims that examination might have tested. However, the patent
was considered in two reported court opinions, and both times the court
found the invention novel.170
The first patent relating to plows was Patent No. X177, to Charles
Newbold on June 26, 1797. The patent is just a couple of paragraphs
with two drawings and primarily discusses a one-piece cast-iron frame
with dual-purpose sheaths and mould plates used for both cutting and
turning.
Patent No. X965, to James Park on December 19, 1808, is for an
alarm bell attached to fire engines.171 The bell is attached using a spring
so that it rings either by vibration or by the power of the wheels. While
this patent is for a manufacture, it is an example of how the actual thing
168. See Walterscheid, supra note 4, at 298.
169. See, e.g., Inventing the Cotton Gin? A Class Debate, NAT‘L MUSEUM OF AM. HISTORY,
SMITHSONIAN INST., http://invention.smithsonian.org/centerpieces/whole_cloth/u2ei/u2mate
rials/eipac1.html. For a thorough history of Whitney‘s patent and lawsuits, including some rare
source materials showing the Patent Office reconstruction of this patent is inaccurate, see
DANIEL A. TOMPKINS, THE COTTON GIN: THE HISTORY OF ITS INVENTION (1901), available at
http://www.archive.org/stream/cottonginhistory01tomp.
170. See Whitney v. Carter, 29 F. Cas. 1070, 1072–73 (C.C.D. Ga. 1810) (referring to prior
Whitney case as well).
171. Interestingly, ―Fire Engine‖ has a dual meaning, as some called steam engines ―fire
engines.‖ See N. Scott Pierce, Common Sense: Treating Statutory Non-Obviousness as a
Novelty Issue, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 539, 557 (2009).
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described is less important than the idea it conveys. Assuming that this
was the first alarm bell on fire engines (or even the first fire-engine
powered, rather than human-powered, bell), the lasting impact of the
invention is more than a spring. It is, at best, the idea of an alarm bell,
and at least, the idea of powering the bell through the engine‘s own
power. Justice Washington charged a jury the same way: ―[T]he
question is not, whether bells to give alarm or notice are new, but
whether the use and application of them to fire engines, to be rung, not
by manual action, but by the motion of the carriage, for the purpose of
alarm or notice, is a new invention . . . .‖172
Similarly, Patent No. X2,244, to Benjamin Freymuth on December
22, 1814, describes what may be the world‘s first small alarm clock.
The alarm is achieved by coiling a ribbon around a spring wheel, which
is released as a pocket watch turns to a certain point. While the
invention itself is primitive (and a little ridiculous), the idea of sounding
an alarm by triggering something at a fixed time in a small bedside
device is an important insight and the basic way most analog alarm
clocks still work. Indeed, the idea seemed ahead of its time, only
catching on some twenty years later, as in Patent No. X7,154, to Robert
Wilson on July 3, 1832.173
Patent No. X2,952, to John Callen on May 4, 1818, is for medicated
liquid magnesia—a product that is still sold today.
The index lists a series of patents related to the use of methods and
machines to print currency in such a way that would make
counterfeiting difficult. These inventions were no doubt a response to
improvements in printing in the early nineteenth century. They are
debated at length in the London Journal of Arts and Sciences.174
In the middle of 1829, there were several patents devoted to
―felting,‖ or creating cloth without spinning or weaving. In fact, three
patents issued within two days,175 two of which were similar enough
that the Patent Office declared an ―interference‖ to determine the
rightful inventor. The parties settled the dispute with all patents

172. Park v. Little, 18 F. Cas. 1107, 1108 (C.C.D. Pa. 1813).
173. U.S. Patent No. X7,154 (granted July 3, 1832); see also List of American Patents
Which Issued in July, 1832, With Remarks and Exemplifications, by the Editor, 11 J. FRANKLIN
INST. 93, 93 (1833) (discussing pocket watch alarm bells), available at http://books.google.com/
books?id=ygwGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA93.
174. See, e.g., 1 LONDON J. ARTS & SCI. 64, 161 (1820).
175. Patents X5,541, to Van Hosen on June 27, 1829, and X5,548, to Peck and Taylor on
June 29, 1829. List of American Patents Granted in June, 1829, with Remarks and
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 4 J. FRANKLIN INST. 169, 192–93 (1829) [hereinafter Patents
Granted in June 1829]. The third is unavailable. The PTO mislabeled No. X5,548 as X5,547,
and the patent can only be viewed by the mislabeled number.
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issuing.176 These patents are early examples of simultaneous invention.
The Franklin Institute noted that new technologies made felting
possible.177 Today, such developments might be at the core of either
several obviousness findings, or alternatively, a patent thicket of
incremental improvements on a basic technology that block each
other.178
Patent No. X5,581, to William Burt on July 23, 1829, is for the first
typewriter as we know it today. In fact, the specification calls it a ―type
writing machine.‖ The description of the patent, which appears typed,
describes a machine that is quite similar to manual typewriters of today,
including ―shifting‖ to use a second letter on the same lever.
Patent No. X1,516, to John Hall on May 21, 1811, is an important
patent for two reasons. First, it claims a new way to load firearms—
through a hole in the back, rather than with a ramrod. Second, it appears
to be a joint patent with William Thornton, the superintendent of patents
at the time.179 One explanation is that Thornton saw Hall‘s invention,
had an improvement of his own that he added, and then issued the
patent to Hall and himself. However, it is not clear this was really a
jointly issued patent. The image of the patent currently available is
printed, which means the Patent Office recreated it after the 1836 fire;
the typeface is even similar to later-issued patents. We do not know
what the original handwritten patent looked like, and recreations are not
always accurate.180 Further, though the header of the patent implies that
the patent is joint, each individual‘s improvement is listed separately—
first Hall‘s, then Thornton‘s. Finally, an image of Patent No. X1,515 is
available, and that patent contains only the text of Thornton‘s invention.
Thus, a more likely explanation is that Thornton saw Hall‘s patent and
wrote one of his own, issuing both on the same day. Patent No. X1,515
is Thornton‘s and Patent No. X1,516 is Hall‘s; both were combined in
an unnumbered patent recreated after 1836; and that recreation was
given the number X1,516.
Thornton‘s version of the patent is also important because it appears
to be the first patent to number each part of a drawing and refer to each
part of the drawing by number in the patent description. Virtually every
176. Patents Granted in June 1829, supra note 175, at 192–93. See also U.S. Patent No.
X5,571 (granted July 15, 1829) and U.S. Patent No. X5,572 (granted July 15, 1829), issued only
two weeks later.
177. Patents Granted in June 1829, supra note 166 (―The revival of this plan for
manufacturing cloth, has, we have no doubt, been suggested by the machines now so
extensively used in the manufacture of hats . . . .‖).
178 For a description of simultaneous invention throughout history, see Mark A. Lemley,
The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 710 (2012).
179. Lutz, supra note 20, at 137.
180. See TOMPKINS, supra note 169.
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patent today follows this practice, but it was extremely rare in the early
nineteenth century, in part because the rules forbade it.
Another firearm patent is Patent No. X5,656, to Samuel Farries on
October 10, 1829. This patent was for the first ―machine gun,‖181
though the description is nothing like the automatic weaponry of today.
Instead, the gun was more likely an early revolver, with eight chambers
that rotated to load ammunition into the barrel.182 Yet it was different
from revolvers of today, as the chambers spun horizontally like a
carousel, rather than vertically like six-shooters today.
Indeed, an automatic machine gun was probably impossible until
about the time of Patent No. 147, to Thomas McCarty on March 11,
1837. McCarty claimed what we now think of as cartridges: ―[T]he
manner of loading the gun by the use of the tube containing the whole
charge, with the arm reaching out, so as to be fired by an outside lock,
or otherwise; which tube remains until the load is discharged, then to be
replaced by another similarly loaded . . . .‖ McCarty claimed that
preloading cartridges would allow for up to ten shots per minute. The
Journal of the Franklin Institute noted that cartridges had been used
before, but for specific guns and not for general use.183 Nonetheless, the
Journal was skeptical of the idea, due to the risk of corrosion.184
Patent No. X6,728, to Josiah French on August 25, 1831, describes
a new mattress made with metal spring coils, which is the foundation of
most mattresses today. The Franklin Institute was (again, wrongly)
skeptical: ―Until experience convinces us that we err in judgment, we
shall rest satisfied with, and, we hope, comfortably on, a good curled
hair mattrass [sic], or in winter, if pleasure is preferred to health, a well
filled feather bed will continue to satisfy us, and be preferred to iron
springs.‖185
Patent No. X6,739, to James Barron on August 30, 1831, claims a
machine for filtering water through a process of pushing the water
181. JAMES H. WILLBANKS, MACHINE GUNS 25 (2004), available at http://www.scribd.com/
doc/47576912/Machine-Guns-An-Illustrated-History-of-Their-Impact.
182. But see List of American Patents Which Issued in October, 1829, with Remarks and
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 5 J. FRANKLIN INST. 22, 25–26 (1830) (arguing that revolving
chamber guns existed before this patent, and that all of them would likely fail to operate
properly, including this patent), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=6-45AQAAIAA
J&pg=PA25.
183. See List of American Patents Which Issued in March, 1837, with Remarks and
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 20 J. FRANKLIN INST. 399, 403 (1837), available at http://books.
google.com/books?id=6ckGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA403.
184. Id.
185. List of American Patents Which Issued in August, 1831, with Remarks and
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 9 J. FRANKLIN INST. 111, 128 (1832), available at http://books.g
oogle.com/books?id=RL5IAAAAMAAJ&&pg=PA128.
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through a sponge. This is a filtration method still in use today, though
the patentee did not recognize the importance of the general method
because he only claimed the specific machine:
We apprehend that it would have given greater security,
had the patentee claimed the filtering of water through
compressed sponge, by means of the foregoing machine, or
any other acting upon the same principle, as it certainly
would not be difficult to construct a machine, different in
its form, and in the arrangement of its parts, in which the
same effect should be produced.186
This passage is also important because it shows that the editors at the
Franklin Institute did not view methods patents as narrowly as some
judges.
Patent No. X7,777, to Levi Kidder on September 20, 1833, is for
what may be the first street sweeper. It looks like an early version of
something that could be in use today. It was, apparently, being tested in
New York City at the time it issued.187
Patent No. X6,600, to Joseph Nicolas on June 13, 1831, is for a
method of exterminating insects in fields by spraying steam on them.
The heat kills them.
Patent No. X8,537, to Benjamin Hays on December 17, 1834, is for
an early ―easy chair.‖ As the name implies, this may be one of the first
recliner chairs—with a backrest that reclines and a footrest that rises, so
that ―invalids‖ can obtain relief. Given his stated intention to aid
invalids, Hays might be surprised at the ubiquity of recliners today.
Finally, Patent No. X9,274, to William Atkinson on December 2,
1835, is for a method of raising sunken ships by filling them with
inflated bags. There is an urban legend that a 1949 Donald Duck
cartoon depicting ping pong balls raising a sunken ship was used as
prior art to defeat a 1960s Dutch patent.188 Apparently a U.S. patent
predated the cartoon by more than one hundred years.
C. Primitive Patents
One of the more amusing features of reading actual patents in the
study (as opposed to the opaque index) is learning about all of the
technology that is now outlawed or otherwise quite primitive. A few
186. Id. at 134.
187. See List of American Patents Which Issued in September, 1833, with Remarks and
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 13 J. FRANKLIN INSTITUTE 247, 257 (1834), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=nB0GAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA257.
188. See Arnoud Engelfriet, The „Donald Duck as Prior Art‟ Case, IUS MENTIS (Nov. 30,
2006), http://www.iusmentis.com/patents/priorart/donaldduck/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2012).
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patents, such as Patent No. X8,985, to John Scott on July 21, 1835,
describe fireproofing using asbestos. Other patents are methods for
making ―white lead‖—the pigmentable base of lead paint.189 One patent
even claimed the use of barium as a base for paint.190 Patent No.
X7,369, to David West on January 11, 1833, was for a ―cosmetic‖ made
with chlorine for the treatment of many skin ailments.191
Indeed, it appears that the patenting of useless medications is an old
phenomenon. Patent No. X7,574, to Jacob Houck on May 9, 1833, was
for a ―panacea‖ that cured no fewer than thirty-five ailments, from
colds, to hysterics, to all diseases of impure blood. The primary
ingredient was rye whiskey. The Journal of the Franklin Institute
mocked this patent:
Why will men be so obstinate as to remain sick for a
long time, and at last to die, whilst panaceas, combining
nearly all the virtues of the long sought elixir of life, are
prepared by so many seventh sons of seventh sons in all our
cities, and offered for sale at the numerous stores with
tinted jars at their windows?192
Ironically, the editors at the Franklin Institute were prescient: ―That the
recipe may not be lost should the patent office be burnt, and the
patentee become the victim of his own remedies, we will place it upon
our pages, and thus insure to it extensive diffusion and continued
duration.‖193
Similarly, Patent No. X7,668, to Daniel Harrington on July 22,
1833, is for a method of treating many diseases by sending electric
shocks through the body, primarily through orifices, beginning with the
anus, vagina, ears, and nostrils. The patentee even described an
additional ―appendage‖ used when shocks are delivered into the rectum.
This was one of many patents to Daniel Harrington for curing disease
with ―galvanic fluids.‖ Harrington is also the inventor of the rocking
chair exerciser business method discussed below. He was apparently
considered an important inventor in the dental area, despite his electrical
inventions.194
189. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. X5,293 (granted Dec. 4, 1828).
190. U.S. Patent No. X8,699 (granted Mar. 18, 1835). Barium is highly poisonous. See
MATERION, http://materion.com/MSDS/m000544.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2012).
191. U.S. Patent No. X7,369 (granted Jan. 11, 1833); see also U.S. Patent No. X8,693
(granted Mar. 18, 1835) (granted to William Gray, for an ointment to cure many diseases).
192. List of American Patents Which Issued in May, 1833, with Remarks and
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 12 J. FRANKLIN INST. 309, 315 (1833).
193. Id.
194. See 2 BURTON LEE THORPE, HISTORY OF DENTAL SURGERY 234 (Charles R. E. Koch
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Patent No. X178, to Thomas Bruff on June 28, 1797, is a scary
looking tooth extractor with a variety of tips for different types of teeth.
Patent No. X7,083, to William Fahnestock on May 25, 1832, is for a
sharpened hoop used to remove tonsils, which is also a bit daunting.
There were many mortising machines, which were quite important
for nineteenth-century construction, but seem primitive next to a
mechanical router of today.
Patent No. X5,532, to John Brown on June 11, 1829, is for a method
of making combs using pieces of scrap ivory glued together;
manufacturing ideas do not get simpler.
Patent No. X5,547,195 to Ebenezer Mustin on June 27, 1829, is for a
method of decorating combs by putting ornaments on them. The
Journal of the Franklin Institute was especially critical of this one:
This process is the same that is practised upon chairs, and
an infinite variety of ornamented articles; the invention, or
discovery, therefore, consists in doing that upon combs
which has in itself no novelty whatever . . . . Query, is this
‗a new and useful improvement on any art, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, not known or used
before the application?‘196
Patent No. X3,112, to Barnabas Langdon on June 5, 1819, shows a
paddle wheel on a boat that is powered by horses running on the deck.
While this is probably a good way to move horses, it probably was not
the best plan for long voyages. Interestingly, an earlier patentee
described the same thing (on land and water) and actually sued someone
for infringing it.197 The defense admitted to using horses to power a boat
on the Delaware River, and used a license from Langdon as a
defense.198 A key defense to the requested injunction in that case is

ed., 1909) (―Dr. Harrington, evidently, was not an expert in electrical science as it was at that
time. His galvanic devices were as far outside the pale of science . . . .‖), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=ccvRAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA232.
195. See U.S. Patent No. X5,547 (granted June 27, 1829). The USPTO has the wrong
patent image associated with this patent number. The image available for X5,547 is actually
Patent X5,548, which the USPTO incorrectly states is unavailable. The Journal of the Franklin
Institute reported X5,547. See Patents Granted in June 1829, supra note 175, at 191–92.
196. Patents Granted in June 1829, supra note 175, at 191.
197. Isaacs v. Cooper, 13 F. Cas. 153 (C.C.D. Pa. 1821) (describing patent for powering
boat using horses). Interestingly, neither the names nor the dates the court cited match a patent
in the index. The closest patent appears to be X2,125, to David Cooper. See U.S. Patent No.
X2,125 (granted May 12, 1814). The court may have considered a reissue, as the court even
questions whether the dates provided match. Isaacs, 13 F. Cas. at 153–54.
198. Isaacs, 13 F. Cas. at 153.
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applicable to the ―patent troll‖199 debate today: no injunction should
issue because the earlier patentee was not using his invention. The court
went so far as to say that if the patentee‘s own use occurs after others
infringe, no injunction may issue.200
Patent No. X5,728, to Stanley Carter on November 25, 1829, is for
sign boards with letters formed by pressing letter-shaped heated metal
onto wood (like branding, but for boards instead of cows). The Journal
of the Franklin Institute criticized the patent as primitive, even then:
We must doubt the validity of such a patent, as it is
merely applying to sign boards, &c. what has been known
and used upon barrels, &c. time out of mind. May a
blacksmith hereafter burn his name upon his door, as we
have frequently seen it done in country shops?201
We classified this as a business method patent.
Patent No. X6,490, to James Johnson on April 18, 1831, is for a
―Fire Escape.‖ The patent describes a set of wooden stairs on two
rolling platforms so as to achieve sufficient height. The Journal of the
Franklin Institute commented at the time that the invention would have
little use because it had to get close to the building (and presumably
would then catch on fire) and also might get in the way of
firefighters.202 That said, the idea caught on both in permanent fire
escapes and in the ladder fire engines of today.
Patent No. X8,839, to Charles and George Sellers on May 22, 1835,
claimed a method of increasing traction by shifting weight to the rear of
a train car. We considered this to be a business method, and anyone who
has ever put a sand bag in their trunk to drive in the snow may thank the
Sellers inventors.
D. Measurement Devices
Many of the patents related to new devices for measurement and
calculation. Some inventors used these devices to perform business
199. ―Patent troll‖ is a pejorative term used to describe patent holders that do not practice
their own patents, but enforce them anyway. See Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and
Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1809–10
& n.3 (2007).
200. Isaacs, 13 F. Cas. at 153–54.
201. List of American Patents Which Issued in November, 1829, with Remarks and
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 5 J. FRANKLIN INST. 126, 138 (1830), available at http://books.g
oogle.com/books?id=6-45AQAAIAAJ&pg=PA138.
202. List of American Patents Which Issued in April, 1831, with Remarks and
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 8 J. FRANKLIN INST. 108, 125 (1831), available at http://books.g
oogle.com/books?id=r-85AQAAIAAJ&pg=PA125.
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methods. For example, Patent No. X866, to Benjamin Dearborn on
April 29, 1808, describes a device for measuring and drawing angles.
The patent language implies that use of the device for that purpose is
within the scope of the patent. The patentee makes clear, however, that
prior devices (squares) were able to make right angles, and disclaims
application of the device for drawing right angles. Similarly, Patent No.
X3,413, to Gabriel Thompson on December 4, 1821, shows a protractor
for measuring angles. Patent No. X8,608, to W.J. Young on January 17,
1835, shows a surveying compass; and Patent No. X8,631, to James
Eames on February 11, 1835, shows a different surveying compass.
Dearborn also obtained several patents on balances for weighing and
lifting things, such as Patent No. X234 on February 14, 1799, and
Patent No. X3,089 on March 24, 1819. Another weighing device is
Patent No. X7,425, to Benjamin Morison on February 13, 1833. This is
for a balance using plates on each side to measure whether one thing is
heavier than the other. The diagram in the Patent Office records looks
like a strange and new device, but the diagram and description in the
Journal of the Franklin Institute imply that the invention was for a
device identical to the scales of justice,203 which was already known at
the time.204
There were also several clothing-measurement devices. Patent No.
X4,687, to J.G. Wilson on February 28, 1827, shows a square for
measuring cloth for tailoring. Wilson also obtained Patent No. X7,566
on May 3, 1833, for a similar device. Wilson claimed the uses of the
tool as well, which makes this a business method patent. Patent No.
X5,234, to Allen Ward on October 11, 1828, shows a device for
measuring shirts and coats. Patent No. X5,327, to Levi Lemont on
January 29, 1829, shows a tall device for measuring the length of coats.
Patent No. X7,591, to Daniel Williams on May 22, 1833, was designed
to draw plain and spherical triangles.205 Patent No. X9,110, to John
Rockafellow on September 18, 1835, is an improvement on the
Williams patent, which is intended to measure the circumference of the
human body.
Patent No. X657, to Cephas Thompson on February 5, 1806, is an
interesting device that allowed painters to transcribe real-world images
onto a canvas by tracing a distant scene appearing in a window.

203. Or, for Monty Python fans, a witch detector.
204. List of American Patents Which Issued in February, 1833, with Remarks and
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 12 J. FRANKLIN INST. 84, 92–93 (1833).
205. List of American Patents Which Issued in May, 1833, with Remarks and
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 12 J. FRANKLIN INST. 309, 321 (1833).
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E. Methods Patents
Early inventors were no strangers to claiming methods, though it is
clear that most inventive activity lay in the making of new things, even
if the primary inventive principle behind the thing was a better method
of operation. The very first patent, Patent No. X1 to Samuel Hopkins on
July 31, 1790, was for a method of making pot and pearl ashes. About
12% of the patents we studied were methods. The role of machines or
transformations will be discussed in Part III, below.
1. Business Methods
While most of the methods studied involved direct manufacturing in
some manner, there were still a few business method patents. The
following Table summarizes the number of business methods patents,
and separates them based on whether they use a machine, transform
matter, or do neither:
Table 3: Business Method Patents
Business
Method:
Methods

1790–
1793
1794–
1836
1836–
1839
Total

2

Using
Machine or
Transforming
0

343

Business
Method:
Percent

No Machine or
Transformation

Percent

0.00%

0

0.00%

2

0.58%

25

7.29%

116

1

0.86%

8

6.90%

461

3

0.65%

33

7.16%

This Table shows that some early inventors sought business
methods patents. Nearly 8% of all methods patents were business
methods patents, and the difference between examined and unexamined
patents is not statistically significant.206
The Table also shows that business methods by and large did not
use a machine or transform matter. This comes as no surprise, as one of
the definitions of a business method patent is one that uses no machine
or transforms no matter. One would further expect early business
methods patents to not involve machines because there were no
206. In a t-test, p=.969.
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computers to process information. Implications of these findings are
discussed in the next Part.
What did early nineteenth-century business methods look like? The
first one we found was the 104th patent that we could read; 207 Patent
No. X1,377, to Samuel Randall on October 1, 1810, described a new
way to teach writing. The concept is simple: lowercase and capital
letters are permanently affixed to a board with spaces next to or below
them. The student‘s imitation of the letters is written on the same board,
but these letters may be wiped off. Thus, the student may practice
writing letters over and over. Similarly, Patent No. X1,642 also to
Randall, claimed a new method of teaching handwriting, but this time
using letters engraved in metal. Students would trace the letters onto
paper placed over the metal. (Ironically, these two patents are nearly
unreadable due to illegible handwriting.)
Patent No. X1,659, to Uri K. Hill on February 7, 1812, claimed a
new musical notation, consisting of an improved way to lay out lines
and represent notes (described as ―do, re, mi . . . ‖) using different
shapes. Hill was a composer of the time.208
Patent No. X5,206, to Francis Kelsey on August 26, 1828, is for a
method of managing bees. This included blowing tobacco smoke to
render them docile, a practice still in use today and derided in the recent
animated film Bee Movie.209 The patent also describes a method of
harvesting honey by moving all the bees from one hive to another,
leaving the first hive empty.
Patent X5,369, to Joseph Manning on February 16, 1829, described
an improvement in the art of writing alphabetically called
―Lektography.‖210 Patent No. X6,504, to Robert McCormick on April
21, 1831, described an improvement in the art of teaching violin
playing. The patent included placing special characters on the neck of
the violin to teach students where to place their fingers.
Other patents attempted to thwart counterfeiting, but did not involve
the engraving plates or machines used in the patents discussed above.
207. There may have been earlier business methods among the destroyed patents.
Candidates include: Patent No. X64, to Joseph Sampson on July 5, 1793, for applying and
regulating sails of ships; Patent No. X129, to Mark Brunel on November 16, 1796, for a method
of ruling books and paper; and Patent No. X376, to Andrew Law on May 12, 1802, for a new
plan for printing music.
208. See 1 CHARLES J. HALL, CHRONOLOGY OF WESTERN CLASSICAL MUSIC VOLUME 1751–
1900 at 102 (2002).
209. BEE MOVIE (DreamWorks Animation 2007).
210. This patent was published with a related book that described alphabetization through
sounds. See JOSEPH B. MANNING, EPEÖGRAPHY (1829), available at http://books.google.com/
books?id=rrtYAAAAMAAJ.
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Patent No. X2,301, to John Kneass on April 28, 1815, claimed the
method of printing on both sides of a bank note rather than on just one
side—not a particular way to do such printing, but any such doublesided printing. Patent No. 320, to J. Dainty on July 31, 1837, claimed a
method of reducing fraud by printing numbers or letters on checks in a
book so that each one would be different. Patent No. 871, to Ebenezer
Watson on August 3, 1838, claimed ―engraving, printing or any way
expressing the sum in large letters, words or figures on the face of the
note . . . .‖ The Patent Office examined Patent Nos. 320 and 871 prior to
issuing such patents.
Patent No. X3,343, to Reuben Langdon on June 20, 1821, described
a method of packaging yarn by putting skeins in colored labels to hold
the yarn in a bundle and to provide information about the yarn. Though
the patent was invalidated for lack of utility in Langdon v. De Groot,211
the method is still in use today in the sale of yarn.
One business method that involved a machine was a method of
washing rags: Patent No. X6,448, to John Ames212 on April 6, 1831.
The patent states: ―The improvement which I claim especially as mine
is the process or method of washing, or cleaning, rags [with an adapted
machine].‖ While the rags would eventually be used to make paper, a
claim to simply washing something is not manufacturing, and is not
limited to manufacturing. Instead, a human achieves the result using a
machine to perform a non-manufacturing act, which we considered a
business method.
Patent No. X4,610, to John Rives on December 22, 1826, describes
a detailed lottery system, including different ways to number tickets,
and the order of determining winners and giving prizes.
Many other business methods patents involve measurements,
including laying out patterns on fabric.213 For example, Patent No.
X9,860, to James Zwisler on July 1, 1836, claimed a method of drawing
each part of a garment in such a way as to minimize wasted fabric.
Patent No. X7,698, to George Beard214 on August 5, 1833, described in
part a method of laying out clothes based on measuring only one part of
the body. The Franklin Institute was skeptical:
211. 14 F. Cas. 1099, 1101 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1822) (No. 8,059) (―But here it is the cotton
alone which it is intended to buy, and the little label and wrapper appended to it, and which
constitute the whole of the improvement, however showy, are stripped off and thrown away,
before it can be used.‖).
212. Ames owned the largest paper manufacturing plant in the United States. A.J.
VALENTE, RAG PAPER MANUFACTURE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1801–1900: A HISTORY, WITH
DIRECTORIES OF MILLS AND OWNERS 7 (2010).
213. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. X7,962 (issued Jan. 18, 1834).
214. Beard was from West Whiteland, Pennsylvania, near the author‘s home in East
Whiteland.
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The patentee must, we imagine, have made the notable
discovery that not only men and women, but men and boys,
are all made to one scale, in length, breadth, and thickness;
a thing which had never before been dreamed of, and
which, if correct, must lead to very important results. We
see no reason, if this be the fact, why by sending to the
taylor [sic] the exact length of the leg, or of any other
member, we may not, without further trouble, have a suit of
clothes made with mathematical precision.215
While most of the measurement patents had some sort of end use in
manufacturing, the patents themselves did not claim the manufacturing
process, but only described the algorithms involved in measurement.
One patent, Patent No. X8,867, to Samuel Stone on June 6, 1835,
explicitly claimed ―the application of the logarithmic calculations as
applied to the circle.‖ Another, Patent No. X6,573, to Erastus and
Thaddeus Fairbanks on June 13, 1831, described a method of weighing
objects by counterbalancing weights on the opposite sides of a beam in
a slightly different manner than other counterbalance scales.216
Finally, perhaps the oldest financial engineering patent217 (excluding
lottery methods)218 is Patent No. X9,118, to John Golder on September
26, 1835, which claimed an improvement in the ―art of finance‖ by
using a credit note that looks like a bond. The Franklin Institute
commented on this invention:
When wheels, levers, or pistons are in question, we feel as
though we could talk familiarly and intelligibly about them;
but when ―Divitial inventions‖ and ―Accumulative Checks‖
are upon the tapis, we are among foreigners and strangers
whose language we do not understand . . . . Under these
circumstances we must not be looked to for any
explanation of the plan before us, but as some of our
readers are versed in the business of stocks and loans, it is,
therefore, presented to them for their consideration.
215. List of American Patents Which Issued in August, 1833, with Remarks and
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 13 J. FRANKLIN INST. 109, 111 (1834), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=nB0GAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA111.
216. List of American Patents Which Issued in June, 1831, With Remarks and
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 8 J. FRANKLIN INST. 330, 342 (1831) (―[T]he machine now
patented is a mere variation of the general principle upon which [prior scales] are made . . . .‖).
217. For a discussion of why business method patents came about, see generally John F.
Duffy, Why Business Method Patents?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1247 (2011).
218. In addition to Patent No. X4,610, discussed above, there appear to be many lottery
patents both before and after 1836, though most of the early ones were lost.
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Whether the foregoing is sustainable under a patent,
does not depend upon its novelty merely, but more
essentially upon the determination of the question whether
the Art of Finance, can be classed among what are
technically called ―the useful arts.‖219
The patent and related comments are interesting for at least two
reasons. First, at least one inventor thought financing methods were
patentable. Second, leading commentators wondered (with apparent
skepticism) whether ―financial arts‖ were useful arts, rather than
asserting outright that they were not because of some clear meaning of
the patent laws from their inception.220 Finally, Golder did not fly under
the radar; he petitioned Congress for aid in enforcing the notes because
the patent authorized them221 (though his plea makes Golder seem more
of a crackpot than a serious financier). Either way, Congress did not act
on his pleas to either enforce or outlaw his type of patent.
2. Recipes
Some argue today that cooking recipes should not be patentable.222
However, there were some examples of recipe patents in the study. For
example, Patent No. X424, to Christopher Hutter on February 11, 1803,
is a recipe for making brandy. Similarly, Patent No. X1,432, to John
Sanders on February 11, 1811, is a recipe for making corn whiskey.
Patent No. X6,550, to Stephen Hinds on May 11, 1831, is a recipe for
beer.
The recipe methods were not all for edibles. For example, Patent
No. X110, to Thomas Bedwell on April 20, 1796, provided a recipe for
creating a yellow pigment, and there were other recipes for creating
pigment as well. Questions arising from this are why recipes for liquor
219. Specifications of American Patents, 17 J. FRANKLIN INST. 270, 277–78 (1836),
available at http://books.google.com/books?id=OskGAAAAYAAJ& pg=PA277.
220. See Jacobs v. Baker, 74 U.S. 295, 298 (1868) (considering, but not ruling, whether
patent for including secret passage in jail is ―art,‖ but not considering question absurd). But see
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3245 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Robert P. Merges, As
Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and
Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 585 (1999) (noting the argument that at the
time of the writing of the Constitution there was little discussion about types of arts that were
patentable because it would have been absurd for someone to patent a method of doing
business)).
221. John Golder, Presenting His Views of Finance (Sept. 25, 1837), in Documents of the
House of Representatives (Thomas Allen ed.), Doc. 33, 25th Congress, First Session, available
at http://books.google.com/books?id=9YcFAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA267.
222. See, e.g., Emily Cunningham, Note, Protecting Cuisine Under the Rubric of
Intellectual Property Law: Should the Law Play a Bigger Role in the Kitchen?, 9 J. HIGH TECH.
L. 21, 32–35 (2009) (discussing pros and cons of patenting cooking recipes).
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should be patentable, but not recipes for other foods; and why recipes
for pigments should be patentable, but not recipes for edibles.
Of course, this does not mean that recipes were legally patented at
the time. Instead, it means that some inventors thought that these recipes
should be patentable.
F. Software Patents
While there were no computers in 1839,223 there was one software
patent. The software patent was Patent No. 546, to E.B. Bigelow on
January 6, 1838, which claimed ―[t]he application of a prism and pattern
card, to regulate the operation of the hooks or teeth or dents to produce
the variations in the pattern or figure.‖ The pattern card was a primitive
punch card224 that guided the operation of the loom to make a certain
rug design.225 We coded this not as a method but as a machine because
the patentee claimed the prism as well as the particular machine that
read the pattern card, rather than the particular design on the pattern
card.
However, this patent highlights the very problems facing courts
today when computers can be either single- or multi-purpose. One could
make new designs by altering the overall loom design so that the hooks
and teeth were permanently tied to a particular pattern, and presumably
patents would be issued on each machine variation if it were
nonobvious.226 It seems odd to call each redesigned ―hardwired‖ loom a
―method,‖ but some call reprogrammed computers methods and
machines interchangeably.227
By introducing the pattern card, the inventor designed a single,
programmable machine. Each pattern card would, in essence, create the
223. Peter D. Junger, Manuscript, You Can‟t Patent Software: Patenting Software Is
Wrong, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 333, 414–17 (2008) (describing the first patented computer).
Charles Babbage is credited with designing the first digital computer, known as the ―Analytical
Engine,‖ although it was never built. Id. Some debate whether primitive punchcards machines
like the loom or player pianos can be compared to the complex data processing of modern
software.
224. The author recalls his father‘s stories of carrying a box of punch cards around
Berkeley‘s electrical engineering campus in 1969 so that he could run the computers there.
225. Punch card looms existed earlier than 1838; Joseph-Marie Jacquard patented them in
1804. See JAMES ESSINGER, JACQUARD‘S WEB: HOW A HAND-LOOM LED TO THE BIRTH OF THE
INFORMATION AGE 35 (2004). Many other Jacquard loom patents followed Bigelow‘s. See, e.g.,
Patent Nos. 1,964 (issued Feb. 3, 1841); 4,537 (issued May 28, 1846); 5,033 (issued Mar. 27,
1847); 5,937 (issued Nov. 28, 1848); 5,939 (issued Nov. 28, 1848); and 6,806 (issued Oct. 23,
1849).
226. Of course, there was no obviousness standard at the time.
227. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc‘ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(holding that subject matter tests apply to software identically whether claimed as method or
apparatus).
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same designs as a prior ―hardwired‖ loom. It seems odd to call each
new loom and card combination a new machine, but those who favor
broad software patentability might argue that a programmed computer
becomes a new machine,228 or at least a new use of an old machine.229
Thus, the tension is similar to that when considering today‘s
computers. Should the patent be granted on a method of weaving if
computer software that controls the loom for the new pattern is
nonobvious? Many people today would say no, but it is unclear why
nonobvious ―hardwired‖ variations in loom design should be patentable,
while nonobvious ―software‖ variations of loom punch card design
should not be, when the resulting products are the same.
Many have struggled to resolve this tension. This Article does not
seek to do so,230 but instead merely points out how old the tension is.
Indeed, one of the oldest, most ridiculous business methods patents
involved a claim to a machine. Patent No. X6,514, to Daniel Harrington
on April 23, 1831, described a ―machine‖ for ―exercising invalids in
their rooms.‖ The machine was a rocking chair with springs. The chair
and the springs were not new and thus, the patent‘s primary claim was
the method of exercise by rocking back and forth against the tension of
springs. (This makes a method for exercising a cat231 look like déjà vu.)
Nonetheless, despite its harsh criticism of other patents, the Franklin
Institute had nothing bad to say about this one.232
G. Implications
This survey of patents issued more than two hundred years ago
provides a historical reason to reject Justice John Paul Stevens‘s claim,
in Parker v. Flook, that ―[i]t is our duty to construe the patent statutes as
they now read, in light of our prior precedents, and we must proceed
cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly
unforeseen by Congress.‖233 In short, the types of patents obtained in
228. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (1994), overruled on other grounds, by In re Bilski,
545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (―We have held that such programming creates a new machine,
because a general purpose computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer once it is
programmed to perform particular functions pursuant to instructions from program software.‖).
229. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006).
230. The author has proposed that we stop trying, at least as a matter of patentable subject
matter. See Risch, supra note 65, at 650.
231. U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036 (filed Nov. 2, 1993) (claiming method of exercising cat by
moving laser pointer).
232. See List of American Patents Issued in April, 1831, With Remarks and
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 8 J. FRANKLIN 163, 168–69 (1831).
233. 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978). Interestingly, the Court cited Deepsouth Packing Co. v.
Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972), to support its position. Congress enacted 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(f) in direct response to that case. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441
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the early nineteenth century bear little resemblance to many of the
current patent classifications today, despite the fact that the statute has
changed
little.234
Semiconductors,
computers,
telephone
communications,
radio
communications,
pharmaceuticals,
biotechnology, nanotechnology, automobiles, and other technology
areas were unforeseen in 1790 when Congress enacted the first patent
statute. Yet, each of these new areas was easily incorporated into the
patent system as inventions arose. Had the courts waited until Congress
acted when each unforeseen breakthrough occurred, patenting would
have screeched to a halt.
On the other hand, devices for carrying out and implementing
mathematical algorithms were foreseen in the early patent system.
There were many patents on simple measuring and calculation devices.
Thus, the prohibition on proceeding cautiously for new technology
should not have applied to the very invention that Justice Stevens was
considering.235 The patent application in Flook was, arguably, the very
type of invention others had sought since the beginning of the patent
system—not often, to be sure, but certainly not unforeseen.
Finally, there are a sufficient number of patents relating to nonmanufacturing methods, describing both business methods and nonbusiness methods, to infer that early patentees did not believe that
patents were limited to ―mechanical arts‖ or ―technological arts,‖ as
some have argued the term ―useful arts‖ means.236 This Article takes no
position on the meaning, but merely points out that this evidence points
in a different direction.

(2007); see also Pub. P.L. No. 98-622, § Title I, § 101(a), 98 Stat. 3383 (Nov. 8, 1984). This
implies both that Congress can act if it so desires, albeit slowly, and more importantly, that the
Court in Deepsouth need not have interpreted the statute so narrowly.
234. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (―Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .‖), with 1790 Patent Act § 1 (―[Whoever] invented or
discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein
not before known or used, and praying that a patent may be granted therefor . . . .‖), and 1793
Patent Act § 1 (―[Whoever] invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or
composition of matter . . . .‖).
235. Flook involved measuring conditions during catalytic conversion and calculating
whether the results exceeded predefined alarm limits. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 584–85.
236. See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 2, at 86–108 (arguing that there is ―no record that the
first United States Congress or the first United States Patent Board considered business methods
to be patentable subject matter‖ but acknowledging that records are incomplete).
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III. THE ―MACHINE-OR-TRANSFORMATION‖ TEST
Just about everyone hates business methods patents, especially the
weak ones, but the question is how to deal with them. The courts have
developed one way to eliminate patents claiming business and
information processing methods: barring all methods that do not pass
the ―machine-or-transformation‖ test.237 Put simply, to be patenteligible, a process must either be tied to a machine or transform
something physical.238 If a claim does not pass this test, it is not
patentable regardless of how novel and nonobvious it may be.
Of course, the test is both under- and over-inclusive of business
methods by design. The Federal Circuit devised it to deal with a patent
that claimed hedging commodity purchase transactions—a ―business
method patent.‖ The hope, perhaps, was that the test would help identify
areas where no patent should be granted. One would think that the test‘s
goal would be to identify business methods, but in fact, the court made
clear that business methods were not barred wholesale.239 Thus, the only
thing the test purportedly identified were claims that did not use a
machine or transform matter. And those methods were not patenteligible based on the Federal Circuit‘s interpretation of Supreme Court
precedent, regardless of the label attached to them.240 As a result, the
test could apply to all methods and not just to suspect ones. It would bar
those that fail even if they are not business methods, and it would allow
those that pass even if they are clearly business methods.
Second, it is not entirely clear whether ―machine‖ really means
machine. This Article assumes as much because the court‘s clear
language requires that a process must be implemented on a machine,
and the court even questioned whether a process performed on a
computer is tied to a ―particular machine.‖241 The Federal Circuit has
defined ―machine‖ as ―a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain
237. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff‟d but criticized sub nom. Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
238. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961.The transformation can also be a transformation of
data representing something physical, such that processing heart rhythm data is a
transformation, while processing money data is not a transformation. See id. & n.26.
239. See id. at 960 (affirming that business method exception to patent eligibility was
unlawful). The Supreme Court agreed that business methods should not be barred wholesale.
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 (2010) (concluding business methods are within the
scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101).
240. For an explanation and critique of the reasoning, see Michael Risch, Forward to the
Past, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 333.
241. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962. See also CLS Bank Int‘l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 768 F.
Supp. 2d 221, 237 (D.D.C. 2011) (―The Court concludes that nominal recitation of a generalpurpose computer in a method claim does not tie the claim to a particular machine or apparatus
or save the claim from being found unpatentable under § 101.‖).
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devices and combination of devices. This includes every mechanical
device or combination of mechanical powers and devices to perform
some function and produce a certain effect or result.‖242 To satisfy the
machine prong of the machine-or-transformation test, the claim must be
tied to a particular machine and impose meaningful limits on the claim‘s
scope; if a claim merely references a machine, it will not satisfy the
test.243
Third, a machine is not always a ―machine,‖ and a transformation is
not always a ―transformation.‖ The court also mandated that
―insignificant post-solution activity‖ does not count as a machine.244 In
other words, one may ignore non-inventive machines or transformations
that are part of the claim, rendering the process ―not implemented on the
machine‖ even if that is the only way to perform it.
Fourth, the machine-or-transformation test is not really the test for
patentable subject matter. The Supreme Court ruled that only abstract
ideas are unpatentable, but noted that the machine-or-transformation test
was a ―clue.‖245
Fifth, even though the test is not really the whole test, courts appear
to be applying it as the test almost exclusively.246 While the Supreme
Court rejected the machine-or-transformation test as a bright-line
rule,247 courts and the USPTO continue to first apply the test and then
look for reasons whether to overrule its presumptive results.248 Indeed,
242. SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int‘l Trade Comm‘n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(quoting In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 771 F. Supp. 2d
1054, 1063–65 (E.D. Mo. 2011) (discussing claim that failed to satisfy machine prong of
machine-or-transformation test).
243. See Fuzzysharp Techs. Inc. v. 3DLabs Inc., Ltd., 447 Fed. App‘x 182, 185 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (holding that implementation of process on ―general purpose‖ computer does not satisfy
the machine test); see also CLS Bank, Int‟l, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 238–39 (D.D.C. 2011).
244. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 957.
245. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227, 3231 (2010).
246. See, e.g., Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
rev‟d, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Ex Parte Johnson, No. 2009-006718, 2010 WL 2998170, at *3
(B.P.A.I. July 29, 2010) (finding that ―claim is therefore directed to software per se, which falls
outside the scope of patentable subject matter.‖); Ex Parte Christian, No. 2009-006589, 2010
WL 3389297, at *2 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 23, 2010) (holding that ―[a] claim that recites no more than
software, logic, or a data structure (i.e., an abstraction) does not fall within any statutory
category. . . . [A]bstract software code is an idea without physical embodiment.‖); Ex Parte
Tse-Huong Choo, No. 2009-006352, 2010 WL 2985362, at *3 (B.P.A.I. July 28, 2010); Ex
Parte Heuer, No. 2009-004590, 2010 WL 3072973, at *8 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 4, 2010).
247. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227 (―The machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for
deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‗process.‘‖).
248. See CLS Bank, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 221, 234, 243 (D.D.C. 2011) (analyzing patent
under machine-or-transformation test first, then under abstract exception); see also Prometheus
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some courts continue to begin and end their analysis with the machineor-transformation test, without looking to the general principles the
Supreme Court set forth. In short, despite the Supreme Court‘s rejection
of it, courts frequently use the machine-or-transformation test, and it is
nearly as important today as it was before the Court ruled.
A. Testing the Historical Criticism
The Federal Circuit claimed that the machine-or-transformation test
was based on historical Supreme Court precedent.249 However, one
critique of the test250 is that it in fact ignores history. In particular:
[I]n its effort to deal with high technology, the [Federal
Circuit] abandoned low technology. There are many
patented processes that have nothing to do with machines
or transformations—methods for measuring fabric,
methods for harvesting fruit, and methods for
manufacturing products by hand (for example, forming
wrought iron). At worst, these types of historically
patentable inventions would now be unpatentable. At best,
determining what is patentable and what is excluded
became much more difficult.251
To test this assertion, this Article looks to its unique data set to
consider whether early inventors thought that patentable methods were
limited to those that used a machine or transformed matter to a different
state or thing.
B. Results
The following Table summarizes the numbers and percentages of
patents from the period of 1790–1839 that were methods, as well as
those that used machines or transformed matter:

Labs., 628 F.3d at 1355, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3027 (2011) (starting
patent eligibility analysis with machine-or-transformation test); Lemley, et al., supra note 160,
at 1319–22 (discussing persistence of machine-or-transformation test).
249. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961.
250. This Article does not challenge the wisdom of the machine-or-transformation test as a
tool for weeding out unmeritorious patents; other articles have done so. See, e.g., Lemley et al.,
supra note 160; Risch, supra note 65, at 647. But see Nikola L. Datzov, The Machine-orTransformation Patentability Test: The Reinvention of Innovation, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 281,
310–24 (2010) (discussing benefits and necessity of machine-or-transformation test).
251. Risch, supra note 240, at 345 (describing consequences of Federal Circuit‘s machineor-transformation test).
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Table 4: Methods Patents and Patents Involving Machines or
Transformations

17901793
17941836
18361839
Total

Coded
Patents
5

Methods % Method

Use Machine?
Transform?
2

% Machine or
Transform
100.00%

2

40.00%

2477

343

13.85%

199

58.02%

1182

116

9.81%

73

62.93%

3664

461

12.58%

274

59.44%

The pattern shows that methods were only a small fraction of all
patents. However, when inventors chose to patent methods, those
methods did not necessarily involve a machine or transform matter to a
new state or thing. More than 40% of all methods patents did not
include the characteristics that courts are using today as presumptive
features of patentable methods. Even if we wrongly coded half of the
patents we read, the percentage would still be high enough to question
the machine-or-transformation test‘s historical validity.
Examples of non-machine and non-transformative patents might be
helpful. The first clear example is Patent No. X168, to Isaac Garretson
on May 29, 1797, which described a method for manufacturing boats
using tubes. The method could be carried out by hand, and the tubes
were still tubes—they were not transformed into a different state. The
next is also a method of constructing boats, Patent No. X449, to
William Hopkins on May 13, 1803. The patent describes how to heat
wood with steam so that the wood bends without breaking, a method
still used today. Here, too, the wood is still wood, and making steam
may transform water, but that is not the method that is being claimed.
The third is Patent No. X617, to Ebenezer Lester on May 10, 1805,
describing a method of making molds for cast iron screws by imprinting
sand with a wooden model of the screw. The patent covers packing sand
(which is not transformed), not the casting of screws. The fourth is
Patent No. X856, to Roswell Pitkin on April 23, 1808. This patent
describes how to prepare fabric by pressing on it with rollers or plates.
The fabric, though flatter and without wrinkles, is unchanged.
Four patents failing the machine-or-transformation test in the first
850 may not seem like many. Note, though, that only fifty-eight patents
from this group were available and legible, and only seventeen of those
described methods. Thus, about 25% of the methods patents from this
first group would have failed the test.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012

53

Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 5 [2012], Art. 4

1332

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

Patent Nos. X5,532252 and X5,547,253 both discussed above as
relating to making combs from scrap parts and decorating combs, are
examples of non-transformative methods. Neither transforms the ivory
into something new. However, they are both clearly directed toward
manufacturing; they are not business methods, and they are not abstract.
Furthermore, some important patents would fall prey to the rule. For
example, Patent No. X7,061, to Thomas Ewbank on May 16, 1832, is
for a method of coating pipes with tin. The method involved dipping a
completed pipe into tin, thus coating the pipe. A rosin is used to bind
the tin to the pipe. The inventor describes why this is an important
improvement over the prior art, which involved making separate pipes
with tin. It is important enough that rosin flux still forms the basis for
coating and soldering today.254 However, this patent does not use a
machine, nor does it transform matter into a different state or thing. The
pipe is still a pipe, and the tin is still tin.255 Perhaps one could argue that
the tin is melted, but the process neither involves a method of melting
the tin nor a method of hardening the tin—it is already melted and is
simply coated onto the pipe in liquid form.
The results did not change after the patent commissioner and his
assistants began examining patents in 1836. The percentage of nonmachine-or-transformation patents drops from 42% to 37%, but the
drop is not statistically significant.256 Even if the change were
significant, the number of methods that would fail the test is still high
enough to reject any claim that early patent examiners believed that all
methods must be tied to a machine or transform matter.
Example patents show that the types of examined claims failing the
test were similar to those filed before 1836. The first such patent is
Patent No. 13, to John Sowle on August 31, 1836, which described a
method of gluing veneer onto mouldings by using a ―double caul.‖257
The double caul pressed on two sides at once, allowing two pieces of
moulding to have veneer added at the same time. The next such patent
is Patent No. 54, to Matthias Baldwin on October 15, 1836, which
claimed a method for preparing a fire in a grate that could be moved to a
train locomotive. While there is transformation of matter in this case
252. To John Brown on June 11, 1829.
253. To Ebenezer Mustin on June 27, 1829.
254. See, e.g., How to Solder, AUBUCHON HARDWARE, http://www.hardwarestore.com/
LearningCenterArticle.aspx?t1=14&a=114 (last visited July 1, 2012).
255. The process does not form a chemical bond; it is similar to painting, and the flux strips
a layer from the surface of the pipe to aid adhesion.
256. In a t-test, p=.352.
257. A caul is a specially shaped piece used to press the veneer to the wood. See Karl
Shumaker, Building a Veneer Press, AM. WOODWORKER, Oct. 1990, at 30, available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=jfsDAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA30.
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(the fire), such transformation would surely be considered unpatentable
post-solution activity258 because the claim is to the movement of the
fire, not the method (hopefully obvious to the inventor) of creating fire
in the first place.
The trend does not end with early patents. The last patent in the
examined group to fail the machine-or-transformation test was Patent
No. 1,139, to Abraham Van Vorhes on May 3, 1839, which claimed a
method for making pumps watertight by using tarred rope in a groove.
The last method is a critically important teaching on the use of modern
day O-rings, yet would be presumptively invalid today.
C. Implications
These historic patents—indeed, prehistoric patents, given the loss of
so many—have relevance to today‘s machine-or-transformation test.
Put simply, even if the test is based on Supreme Court discussion, it is
not based on historical practice. Further, the potential for error is great,
even as applied to high technology.
1. Problems with the Basis for Machine or Transformation
Any implication that methods patents always used a machine or
transformed matter ignores history. The critique quoted above, that the
test sacrifices low-technology methods to weed out business methods,
appears accurate.259 The test would, as predicted, bar a substantial
percentage of the patents early inventors sought. The trend continues
with patents granted after the institution of an examination system.
Thus, there is no reason to believe that there was a selection bias prior
to the examination system (with respect to this issue, at least).
It is possible that the Federal Circuit just did not think of lowtechnology methods because it sees very few of them, especially in
today‘s high-technology litigation climate. Even the dissent missed the
history, attributing the test to ―the past,‖ but the dissent did not look far
enough into the past.260
But the rare low-technology patent is no reason to eliminate all
low-technology methods. The reason we might not allow many such
patents today is that they are likely old or obvious. Low-technology
258. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 957 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff‟d but criticized sub nom. Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
259. See supra text accompanying note 251.
260. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1011 (Rader, J., dissenting) (―Much of the court‘s difficulty
lies in its reliance on dicta taken out of context from numerous Supreme Court opinions dealing
with the technology of the past. In other words, as innovators seek the path to the next technorevolution, this court ties our patent system to dicta from an industrial age decades removed
from the bleeding edge.‖).
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methods should be judged on these factors rather than be excluded
wholesale by an over-inclusive rule.
Yet, the allure of easy decision making beckons. Drawing clear
subject matter lines barring inventions that are meritless anyway is
potentially efficient. Even so, the shortcut is unpalatable in the face of
inventive history. The statutory definition of patentable subject matter
has not changed significantly since 1790.261 To suddenly and
categorically bar many types of patents that were state of the art when
the statute was first enacted cannot be a principled answer to the
patentable subject matter problems of today.
2. Identifying Business Methods
The irony, of course, is that the machine-or-transformation test
appears to be quite accurate in identifying historic business methods
patents. Almost all of the business methods we identified did not use a
machine or transform matter.
However, this finding does not mean that the test should be used
today. Even as applied in history, use of the test would have barred five
times as many false positives (about 150) as true positives (about 30).
Thus, even if the test appears accurate when applied to business
methods, it would eliminate far too many ―proper‖ patents.
The test is also likely under-inclusive today because more and more
business methods use machines to do the processing. The institution of
the machine-or-transformation test makes this especially true because it
put applicants on notice that they should add ―on a computer‖ to all
their claims. While the test supposedly disregards ―insignificant‖ use of
a computer, there are bound to be many false negatives—that is, the
approval of business methods claims because they seem to use a
machine. There are also bound to be many false positives—the rejection
of manufacturing and other non-business methods claims because a
computer is considered to be insignificant post-solution activity.
In short, the limited predictive ability of the test is outweighed by
the probability of both false positives that would reject ―good‖ lowtechnology methods and false negatives that would allow ―bad‖ hightechnology business methods.

261. Compare 1790 Patent Act § 1 (noting that an invention or discovery is eligible for
patent protection if it is any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device), with 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (2006) (noting that ―any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof‖ may be patented).
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CONCLUSION
In Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court held that nothing in the
Patent Act excludes business methods per se, but that abstract principles
are not patentable.262 Justice Stevens‘s concurrence criticized this
holding as ignoring the history of case law to the contrary. 263 That
history, though, never starts at the beginning, and is never read in the
proper context of English law, early patent construction, and early
patenting without machines or transformations. Indeed, there were
business methods patented early in our nation‘s history, and—as the
caselaw shows—throughout history until today. While many may not
like business methods, neither patentees nor the Patent Office objected
to them for much of our history.
Thus, it may be that the Bilski Court got it right: There is nothing in
the statute that categorically bars business methods patents, and court
opinions throughout history that narrowed patentability were wrong. Of
course, it is unlikely that this Article will convince those that oppose
broad patentable subject matter to change their minds.
Hopefully, however, the findings here will focus the discussion on
the appropriate areas. Some examples of areas for discussion include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

whether useful arts are limited to manufacturing and, even if
so, whether changing technology over time means that our
view of useful arts should expand;
whether early judicial decisions hostile to patentable processes
should be relied on today, despite later rejection by the
Supreme Court and contrary language in the 1952 Patent Act;
whether courts should disregard patents claiming physical
processes and machines to instead find abstract principles;
whether there are policy reasons to limit business methods
patents despite their apparent patentability, and how to identify
such patents; and
whether there are existing and generally applicable reasons to
disfavor business methods, such as obviousness or lack of
practical utility.

These and other issues are quite important. This Article provides
some insight into how we should view them in light of our early
inventive history. In short, we must consider these issues today, because
history does not provide the answer.

262. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. at 3228, 3231 (2010).
263. See id. at 3235 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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